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Abstract 
 
 
 
In his 2010 book “The Moral Landscape” neuroscientist Sam Harris claims that science can 
determine human values. This thesis investigates and evaluates Harris‟ claim in the context of 
contemporary meta-ethics. I want to show that this kind of scientific moral realism has the 
resources to face up to the explanatory challenges found in meta-ethical literature, and to 
explain how something can be said to be morally true without relying on empirically 
unsupported evaluative premises. Harris suggests that morality is much like health. We can 
never know how healthy it is possible to become, or if everyone can be as healthy as possible 
at the same time, but we can distinguish a healthy person from a sick one and use science to 
identify the causes of health (that which is good for you). We humans will care about what 
happens in our world, and while we can never know how satisfied it is possible to become 
with the state of the world, we can distinguish a satisfied person from an unsatisfied one 
and—as Harris suggests—knowledge about the causes of well-being (values) “may one day 
fall within the reach of the maturing sciences on mind”. As long our nervous systems share 
roughly the same anatomy—like our bodies do—we should expect our well-being to 
systematically depend on the same external factors. It is uncertain whether Harris‟ theory 
qualifies as genuine moral realism, and if it is actually able to distinguish right from wrong 
practices, even given complete descriptive knowledge. The meta-ethical distinction between 
facts and values, and the tasks moral judgments are supposed to accomplish in order to be 
called “true” provide some serious explanatory challenges to Harris‟ theory. I will look at the 
meta-ethical framework before Harris‟ theory, so as to be able to present Harris‟ theory as an 
answer to the meta-ethical challenges. I first present Harris‟ theory as a cognitivist theory, and 
then consider how the cognitive moral judgments it arrives at can be said to be true. As it 
turns out Harris provides a challenge of his own to the current meta-ethical framework. It 
seems to reveal a deep disagreement about what qualifies as moral truth. I ultimately think 
that Harris makes a good case for the plausibility of the maturing sciences of mind developing 
moral prescriptions and valuable practical moral guidance. I also think that many such 
prescriptions can be considered true on par with other scientific propositions. If this doesn‟t 
qualify as moral truth, then perhaps that demands of meta-ethics are too strict.  
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Preface  
 
 
 
This thesis is the culmination of five years of study at the University 
of Oslo. While the thesis itself is focused on Sam Harris‟ theory of 
how science can determine human values, the general topic—science 
and morality—is representative of these five years. My interest in 
understanding human behavior, social organization and ideology lead 
me towards studying both the empirical approach of the social 
sciences and psychology, and the philosophical approach of moral and 
political philosophy. When engaging in academic life one soon 
recognizes the enormity of the cumulated knowledge possessed by 
humans, and sadly realize how little of it one is able to learn in five 
years. Even so, there is much material that I wish could have made its 
way into this thesis, but which there was no space to discuss properly. 
I feel particularly indebted to Daniel Dennett‟s naturalist and multi-
disciplinary approach to philosophical questions, which have had no 
small role in shaping my own naturalist views, but which is too far 
removed from the meta-ethical perspective of this thesis to be 
included. It was also Dennett who lead me to Sam Harris, through 
their collaboration as critics of religion and other empirically 
unjustified belief. I have had a great time researching and writing this 
thesis, and I hope it will prove enjoyable for the reader as well.  
 
 
 
Tore Skålevik                                                               Oslo, May 2013     
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Introduction: Questions of Value 
 
 
 
In the grand scheme of philosophical debate the question “can science can determine human 
values?” is relatively small. Most people seem to believe that science just isn‟t the kind of 
method that can address questions of value, and as such waste little time really considering 
the issue. This is a mistake according to neuroscientist Sam Harris.  
 To Harris, questions about how to act, how to live our lives and how to organize our 
societies are “the most important questions in human life”. For naturalists, like Harris, 
attempting to understand how such questions can be answered in the context of science is a 
pivotal task. Given that our universe—including brains and minds—is lawful, and that 
empirical observation provides the basis for knowledge, leaving reason with an instrumental, 
relational and “model-building” role, we see that if there are any moral facts they must in one 
way or another rely upon scientific knowledge. Can there be such facts?  
In his 2010 book “The Moral Landscape”1 Harris argues that science can in fact 
determine human values. He argues that it must be so, given what we currently know about 
human nature and the nature of the universe in general. Harris‟ theory will not allow us to 
immediately answer all normative moral questions. Instead it argues that the questions we can 
ask today do have objective answers which we can seek, and which we may be able to find at 
some point in the future, given substantially more scientific knowledge. Harris‟ theory is 
almost exclusively meta-ethical. It wants to explain what moral questions and moral 
judgments are about, and what is required for a moral judgment to be true. It wants to argue 
that we have knowledge of at least some moral truths today, and that there are more moral 
truths to be known given more scientific knowledge. In principle—Harris argues—we can 
know all moral truths given full scientific knowledge. This is how Harris describes his thesis:   
 
“I want to be very clear about my general thesis: I am not suggesting that 
science can give us an evolutionary or neurobiological account of what 
people do in the name of “morality.” Nor am I merely saying that science can 
help us get what we want out of life. These would be quite banal claims to 
make—unless one happens to doubt the truth of evolution, the mind’s 
dependency on the brain, or the general utility of science. Rather I am 
                                                 
1
 The full title is “The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values”. I will use the 
abbreviation “ML” when referring to this book. 
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arguing that science can, in principle, help us understand what we should do 
and should want—and, therefore, what other people should do and should 
want in order to live the best lives possible. My claim is that there are right 
and wrong answers to moral questions, just as there are right and wrong 
answers to questions of physics, and such answers may one day fall within 
reach of the maturing sciences of mind.” (ML p. 28) 
  
A more modest goal of “The Moral Landscape” is to “begin a conversation about how moral 
truth can be understood in the context of science” (ML p. 2). It is possible—and I think 
appropriate—to view Harris‟ theory as the first contribution, setting the stage for this 
discussion. Viewed this way the theory appears more tentative and less explicit then its 
subtitle “How Science Can Determine Human Values” seems to imply. The ambition of “The 
Moral Landscape” as a philosophical project is not to put forward an exact formula for the 
scientific determination of human values, but to show that we don‟t need to invoke a priori 
reasoning or make empirically unsupportable assumptions in order to talk about moral truth.    
 
* 
 
Like Harris, I consider it to be a very important task to seriously consider whether science can 
help us answer the most important questions in human life, and if so how. My goal in this 
thesis is to consider whether Harris‟ theory has the resources to face up to the explanatory 
challenges found in contemporary meta-ethical literature. Meta-ethics is an extremely 
complex field of study with a large number of competing theories all seeking to explain 
morality,
2
 and there is no way I will be able to do justice to all of Harris competitors in this 
thesis. My focus will be on Harris‟ theory itself, and whether it constitutes a viable naturalist 
explanation of morality, which can rise up to challenge the various existing explanations. In 
line with Harris‟ agenda I want to show that it is possible to understand moral truth in the 
context of science; that it is possible that our moral judgments have scientifically 
determinable truth conditions; and that it therefore is a possibility that science can help us 
answer the most important questions in human life. By discussing Harris‟ particular view on 
how science can determine human values, I hope to show that it is plausible enough so that 
it—and similar theories—can‟t be dismissed as non-starters, on the ground that they can‟t 
possibly meet the explanatory challenges in meta-ethics. This is what I mean when I say that I 
                                                 
2
 This is one of the conclusions of Darwall, Gibbard and Railton‟s 1992 review of meta-ethics. 
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will consider if Harris‟ theory constitutes a viable naturalist explanation of morality. I don‟t 
intend to show that Harris‟ particular explanation of morality is the best currently available 
explanation. Other kinds of explanations—notably rationalist and non-cognitivist—have been 
in development for a very long time, and one wouldn‟t expect a relatively undeveloped 
explanation, such as the one discussed here, to compare favorably to them right at the outset, 
at least not before it has been acknowledged as a viable kind of explanation of morality.   
 
* 
 
In order to achieve my goal there are several things I need to do. If I want to show that Harris 
theory is a viable meta-ethical alternative, I need to show that it has the resources to meet the 
explanatory challenges found in contemporary meta-ethical literature. To do so, we need to 
know what these challenges are. Harris is facing roughly the following two tasks: (i) Showing 
that moral judgments are truth-apt mental states, like beliefs. (ii) Showing that there exist 
empirically available truth-conditions capable of justifying at least some moral judgments. 
Harris must show both these things without compromising a fundamental feature of moral 
judgments, namely that they provide us with a reason for acting in accordance with them. 
Moral truth would be trivial if at the end of the day believing or disbelieving a moral 
proposition had no normative effect on our behavior. The challenges from contemporary 
meta-ethics are particularly well formulated in Michael Smith‟s “The Moral Problem” (1994), 
which will be discussed in chapter 2.  
I will of course also have to present Harris‟ actual theory. I start by developing what I 
take to be Harris‟ core theory of value in chapters 3 and 4. These chapters attempt to explain 
value as a natural phenomenon, but don‟t address, explain or define moral value. The account 
I develop in chapters 3 and 4 is very similar to the account of (natural and non-moral) value 
defended by naturalist philosopher Peter Railton (Railton 1986a & 1986b), and his thoughts 
will be very helpful in specifying the position. The theory of natural value forms the 
foundation for a naturalist solution to the moral problem. It rejects what is known as “value 
absolutism” as well as “value subjectivism”, and argues instead that values are relational. 
What is “good for” or “valuable to” any given organism or group of similarly constituted 
organisms will depend on what they are like and how they are affected by events in the world 
at large. The purpose of the account is to show that value-claims are truth-apt, by showing 
that they are really claims about physical reality.  
4 
 
Chapter 5 and 6 discuss how our concept of “moral value”—as characterized in “The 
Moral Problem”—fits into the theory of natural value. Can we accept that claims about moral 
value are relational claims on par with claims about what is personally valuable, or do moral 
values need to be absolutistic in order to achieve the appropriate binding force?  On this 
question Harris parts with Railton and traditional naturalist though. Like most philosophers—
including several of Harris‟ critics—Railton doesn‟t seem to think that relational value-claims 
accurately capture what we mean by “moral value” and that to answer moral questions we 
need to (re)define “moral value” as something like “the maximization of natural value”. This 
amounts to making the unscientific assumption that “the maximization of natural value” is 
(absolutely) valuable to everyone. Because of the unscientific nature of such an evaluative 
premise, I think this a move is unavailable to Harris, who wants to show that science 
determines human values. I take Harris to argue that moral value-claims really are a form of 
relational value-claims.  
Chapter 7 mounts some serious criticism against Harris characterization of moral 
value. The critics I discuss each in some way attribute an evaluative premise—like the 
assumption that “the maximization of natural value” is (absolutely) valuable to everyone—to 
Harris, some claiming that he explicitly supports such a premise and some saying that it is a 
hidden assumption. In all cases they mean to show that without making this, or a similar, 
assumption Harris‟ model of the moral landscape fails to reveal any moral facts.  
The rest of the thesis (chapters 8 through 11) formulates and discusses the success of 
Harris response to this critique. Notably Harris thinks that his relational definition of moral 
value is analogous to our definition of what is healthy. As long as we consider medicine to 
generate medical truths, we must also allow a science of natural value to generate moral 
truths. This analogy is very interesting, because if Harris is correct we can use the arguments 
designed to refute Harris‟ particular kind of moral realism to refute medical realism. What 
Harris seems to be arguing is that even if we can‟t assume an evaluative premise to ground 
moral truth, we don‟t have to abandon moral truth, like his critics suggest we must. Harris 
main strategy for making this point seem plausible is to elaborate the analogy between 
morality and health.
3
  He wants to convince us that a science of morality enjoys the same kind 
of normative relation to the life of human beings as medicine does. The main question that 
                                                 
3
 The analogy is a prominent feature in “The Moral Landscape”, but the extent of Harris‟ reliance on the analogy 
is most evident in his extensive “Response to Critics” (2011), where he among other uses, clearly reveals its 
foundation role, and why it is reasonable to call it his main strategy: “Unless you understand that human health is 
a domain of genuine truth claims—however difficult "health" may be to define—it is impossible to think clearly 
about disease. I believe the same can be said about morality. And that is why I wrote a book about it...”    
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arises out of Harris model is whether it can deal with what we may call “substantial moral 
questions”. While health is a reasonably robust concept, at least intuitively, which provides a 
great deal of practical guidance, there is even in medicine real disagreement not only about 
what, in particular, is conducive to health—what is “healthy”—but also on how to conceive of 
health. Maybe we can agree that blowing up the earth is morally bad, like we can agree that 
arsenic is unhealthy, because both seems to be obviously true for all human beings. But are 
these the kind of moral truths we are after?  Can a science of morality modeled on medicine 
even approach the hard questions of ethics?  Or does the analogy run out of fuel, and power of 
conviction, just at the point where ethics gets interesting—and difficult? 
“The Moral Landscape” presents us with an unusual approach to ethics, and to 
properly understand the theory I think that it is important to understand why Harris wrote it 
and what it is meant to achieve. Placing the theory into its appropriate context before 
attempting to analyses it in the context of meta-ethics will shed some light on Harris‟ apparent 
failure to address some of the issues I will subject it to in this thesis. This is the task I turn to 
first, in chapter 1.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Chapter 1: When Scientists Talk About Morality 
 
 
 
Everyone comes to meta-ethics with different backgrounds, and with different answers to 
foundational questions about, for example, the roles and limits of reason and science. This 
first chapter is about Harris‟ background, and some of the assumptions and definitions 
underlying the ideas he brings to meta-ethics.  
Sam Harris‟ PhD is in neuroscience, and his primary field of research is belief. Harris 
also seems to have an inclination towards philosophy, and before becoming a neuroscientist 
he acquired a BA in philosophy. However, Harris is probably best known as an advocate of 
science and empiricism and a critic of faith and religion. In 2004 Harris convinced the major 
publisher W. W. Norton to pick up and support his first book “The End of Faith”, the first 
book to feature the core view on the immorality of religion and other faith-based belief which 
has now become known as “New Atheism”. The book won the PEN/Martha Albrand award 
for first nonfiction in 2005,
4
 and spent a total of 33 weeks on the New York Times best seller 
list for paperback nonfiction.
5
 This commercial success made easier the publication of similar 
books including Richard Dawkins‟ “The God Delusion” (2006), Daniel Dennett‟s “Breaking 
the Spell” (2007), Victor Stenger‟s “The New Atheism” (2009) and the late Christopher 
Hitchens‟ “God is not Great” (2009). Sam Harris can be said to have had a foundational role 
in launching the new atheist movement. 
One unsurprising aspect of the New Atheist movement is that they reject God. 
However some of the new atheists—in particular Sam Harris—have drawn wider ethical and 
normative conclusions from their general arguments employed against the existence of gods. 
The new atheist‟s critique of faith does not limit itself to religious belief but targets all faith-
based beliefs in all areas. Further—and more important for this thesis—they claim that acting 
on the basis of faith-based beliefs is immoral.  
One central new atheist figure, Victor Stenger, explains that the new atheists argue for 
“a far less accommodating attitude” towards any kind of irrational or faith-based belief, which 
is defined as “belief in the absence of empirical evidence, and often in the face of contrary 
evidence” and that “to act on the basis of faith can often be to act in conflict with reason. We 
                                                 
4
 http://www.pen.org/literature/2005-literary-awards-winners (viewed May 4th 2013) 
5
 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/books/bestseller/0218bestpapernonfiction.html (viewed May 4th 2013)  
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New Atheists claim that to do so is immoral, and dangerous to society” (Stenger 2010). While 
not necessarily accurate for all new atheists is sums up Harris‟ position very well.   
In “The End of Faith” Harris argues for the common atheist position that religious 
beliefs are absurd, but the main force of the book is its moral argument: that religious beliefs, 
even moderate ones, are immoral (Harris 2004). This line of moral argumentation is present, 
though perhaps less prominent, in the other books mentioned. Dawkins brings up the point 
that teaching children that hell is a real place—in complete absence of empirical evidence for 
this claim—is a form of child abuse equivalent to, and perhaps even worse than, physical 
abuse (Dawkins 2006 p. 356). As far as one can justify the moral wrongness of child abuse 
then, the wrongness of this particular religious belief follows. On Harris account, “beliefs are 
principles of actions: whatever they may be at the level of the brain, they are processes by 
which our understanding (and misunderstanding) is represented and made available to guide 
our behavior (Harris 2004 p. 52).
6
  
A brief analysis of the moral argument from “The End of Faith” reveals that it is a 
consequentialist argument, condemning actions following from unjustified religious action-
guiding beliefs for the harmful consequences they cause. The fact that the New Atheist 
movement started shortly after September 11
th 
2001 is no accident. While suffering in and of 
itself is only a direct consequence of some extreme religious beliefs, the more general 
conclusion of “The End of Faith” is that all beliefs which are out of accord with empirical 
reality in the very least threaten to produce harmful consequences by causing believing agents 
to act against empirical evidence, and by preventing them from seeking the truth. This is 
particularly referring to actions like suicide bombings which are caused, on Harris account, by 
beliefs in a variety of positive personal and social consequences following from such actions. 
In Dawkins‟ case the belief in hell causes—through the act of teaching—great psychological 
trauma to the children exposed to this belief.      
Before Harris engaged the issue in “The Moral Landscape” none of the New Atheists 
had attempted to produce a philosophical foundation to back up their consequentialist moral 
views, or refute criticism aimed at this particular position.
7
 Their alleged inability to produce 
                                                 
6
 This characterization of belief is similar both in content and terminology to ideas from the pragmatist tradition 
dating back to C. S. Peirce (Peirce described beliefs as “rules for action”) (see for example Hookway 2008). 
Harris abandons this terminology in ML, perhaps to distance himself from the pragmatist position which he 
rejects as a whole (despite agreement on several points) because of its relativistic implications for morality 
(Harris 2004 p.179).  
7
 Daniel Dennett has written much on a naturalistic understanding of values. However Dennett doesn‟t seem to 
share Harris moral realism, and seems to reject the idea that we in practice can arrive at moral truth by 
considering the consequences of actions. Dennett (1995 p.494-499) discusses the “Three Mile Island Effect”. 
The meltdown at the nuclear plant at Three Mile Island had tragic consequences, but it also had positive 
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a sophisticated secular and scientific alternative to the religious moral foundations they set out 
to condemn and destroy was—and remains—a general source of criticism. According to 
Harris, this criticism comes from believers and non-believers alike: 
 
“People who draw their worldview from religion generally believe that moral 
truth exists, but only because God has woven it into the very fabric of reality; 
while those who lack such faith tend to think that notions of “good” and “evil” 
must be the products of evolutionary pressure and cultural invention. […] My 
purpose is to persuade you that both sides in this debate are wrong.” (ML p. 
2) 
    
The “sides” that Harris refers to are sides in the ongoing “culture wars” being waged “both in 
the United States, between secular liberals and Christian conservatives, and in Europe, 
between largely irreligious societies and their growing Muslim populations.” (ML p. 4). 
 Harris seems to be claiming that there currently is no generally acknowledged source 
of moral value and moral truth for secularists to ground their moral beliefs in. I think the 
observed failure to agree on moral foundations, both in philosophy and elsewhere, make this a 
reasonable assessment. His further claim—that “those who lack [...] faith tend to think notions 
of “good” and “evil” must be the products of evolutionary pressure and cultural invention”—
amounts to the claim that secularists commonly believe that morality is not real, making them 
moral relativists or moral nihilists. This claim is admittedly based on feedback that Harris has 
received on his previous books and on talks he has given on morality. Exactly how dominant 
moral relativism and moral nihilism is in the scientific and secular communities is not 
relevant to my thesis, and I will not attempt to evaluate it. However, only from a realist 
position can Harris defend the kind of moral condemnation he wields against religion, and we 
note that one of Harris‟ primary goals in “The Moral Landscape” is the rejection of moral 
anti-realism.     
This goal may explain much of the philosophical interest in Harris‟ project. Within 
academic philosophy the debate between moral realism and moral anti-realism is prominent. 
According to a recent survey, 56.4% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism, 
while 27.7% accept or lean towards anti-realism, and 15.9% answered „other‟.8 This debate is 
                                                                                                                                                        
consequences on nuclear safety. Was it a good thing?  The same ambiguity could be attributed to the 
consequences of the September 11
th
 attacks. Ultimately Harris doesn‟t end up endorsing this kind of utilitarian 
calculus.   
 
8
 philpapers.org/surveys . In the same survey 72.8% were atheists, 14.6% theists and 12.6% answered other. 
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complicated, with several issues being debated as well as a myriad of rival positions on each 
side of the realist/anti-realist divide. Three of the most prominent contemporary moral 
philosophers describe the scene as “remarkably rich and diverse” in their influential article on 
the historical development and current state of meta-ethics (Darwall, Gibbard & Railton 
1992), and in chapter 2 we will see why this is the case.  
 
* 
 
I now want to outline the approach to knowledge underlying Harris thesis. As an empiricist 
Harris thinks that all knowledge traces back to observation. On this view, claims about reality 
can only be justified, or count as true, when tested against observations of the natural world. 
This is basically to say that science is the only method for justifying claims about reality, 
including moral propositions. As a philosophical position, empiricism is not without 
competitors. There are some good arguments suggesting that some propositions can be 
justified a priori, meaning that they can be justified and count as true based only on reason 
and logic, independent of any empirical evidence. That debate goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. My goal, as stated in the introduction, is to consider if science can reveal moral truth. 
As such it doesn‟t matter all too much if there are also other ways to justify moral truth, even 
if Harris denies that there can be. Our empirical approach means, however, that we can‟t view 
conceptual problems as preceding our current scientific understanding of reality. This does 
not mean that conceptual problems aren‟t real; it means that they don‟t arise, and certainly 
can‟t be solved, prior to experience. To illustrate this point consider our concepts of 
“something” and “nothing”. The conceptual distinction between these two concepts is about 
as clear as anything can be. It seems as though it must be true independent of any observation 
of an external world that “something” is different than “nothing”. Based on this it becomes a 
conceptual problem to explain how the universe (something) can come from nothing. No 
matter how much “something” we observe by scientific means, it seems impossible to explain 
how this something could have come from nothing. Basically this a priori “knowledge” that 
we have of “something” and “nothing” is preventing us from taking anything science tells us 
as answers to questions about the origin of the universe.  
In their book “The grand Design” (2010) physicists Stephen Hawking and Leonard 
Mlodinow makes the claim that science is now capable of answering all questions which 
traditionally has belonged to philosophy—including “why is there something rather than 
nothing?” as well as “why do we exist?” and “why this particular set of laws and not some 
10 
 
other?”—and that in this sense “philosophy is dead” (Ibid p. 5). What they seem to mean by 
“philosophy” here is precisely such a priori reasoning. Their claim is not that such questions 
are answerable by people in white lab-coats doing experiments, but that questions such as 
these can‟t be answered outside the context of modern science. The model that modern 
science, particularly physics, has created of reality is so strange and so counter-intuitive that 
without it we are bound to get our concepts of “something”, “nothing”, “space”, “time”, 
“past”, “future”, “causation”, “motion”, “infinity”, “complexity” and so on, wrong by simply 
considering them independent of empirical reality. The conceptual problems that philosophers 
deal with are therefore often confused and only follow from “naive” and incomplete models 
of reality (Ibid p. 7). One of the things Hawking and Mlodinow argue is that science has 
shown us that “something” and “nothing” isn‟t really that different at all. There is in a sense 
no such thing as “nothing” as we typically understand it. An even better, and more recent, 
formulation of these arguments in non-mathematical terms is found in Lawrence M. Krauss‟ 
“A Universe from Nothing” (2012).   
Harris too distinguishes between a broad and a narrow definition of science. In the 
narrow sense science is limited to careful observations, measurements and experiments. 
Harris thinks that science in this narrow sense “should be considered a specialized branch of a 
larger effort to form true beliefs about events in our world.” (ML p. 195 endnote 2). This 
“larger effort” is the broad definition of science, and it depends on the use of reason to 
produce theoretical models of the world—including concepts such as “right” and “wrong”—
which agree with and explain relevant (narrow) observations, and as such it is a joint effort by 
scientists and philosophers alike. Harris seems to think about the human nervous system, like 
Hawking and Mlodinow think about physical reality. Harris seems to think that an updated 
scientific model of the human nervous system and how it is affected by the world shows us 
that many of our common sense concepts about mental states and value—in particular our 
conception of facts and values as distinct existences—are wrong. The main reason that Harris 
gives for not engaging most of the meta-ethical literature is that he didn‟t develop his theory 
based on this literature, but “came to [his position on the relationship between human values 
and the rest of human knowledge] by considering the logical implications of our making 
continued progress in the sciences of mind.” (ML p. 197 en. 1).   
 Harris‟ scientific approach to moral questions provides several challenges when giving 
a philosophical evaluation of his theory. Harris is not a professional philosopher and his 
writings are not aimed at academic philosophy. While his arguments are fundamentally 
philosophical they have been rhetorically adjusted to convince other scientists and other 
11 
 
interested parties in the general population. Harris has decided that his target audience would 
be bored by too much philosophical complexity and jargon. While he might be correct, his 
choice has the unfortunate effect of leaving his position on some important philosophical 
issues unclear and ambiguous. It will therefore be necessary to present Harris‟ ideas in a more 
complete philosophical guise then he does himself, which will involve some interpretation on 
my part. This gives me the opportunity to develop, or at least clarify, Harris‟ ideas, so 
hopefully some good will come of it. Before jumping to his actual theory, I will in the next 
chapter look at some of these conceptual problems which Harris largely avoids addressing 
directly. 
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Chapter 2: The Moral Problem 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will attempt to make sense of the main challenges facing those who wish to 
engage in contemporary meta-ethics, whether they come from philosophy or neuroscience. 
These are ultimately the challenges Harris will have to overcome if his moral theory is to be 
successful. I briefly mentioned these challenges in the introduction. What I didn‟t mention in 
the introduction is that it is considered close to impossible to provide a coherent explanation 
of all the aspects of morality. For example, if Harris can explain how moral judgments are 
truth-apt—like we will see him do in chapters 3 and 4—then he apparently can‟t also hold 
that moral judgments provides the necessary motivating reason for acting in accordance with 
them. The argument I will present in this chapters quite accurately predicts the kind of 
criticism we will see applied to Harris‟ theory in chapter 7.    
Why do we think that it is necessary for a proper moral judgment be both truth-apt (like 
a belief) and motivating (like a desire), and why is it so difficult to explain how a judgment 
can have both these attributes?  My answer to these questions is based on what seems to me 
the best formulation of the problem to date, Michael Smith‟s “The Moral Problem” (1994). 
This book was published two years after the already mentioned essay by Darwall, Gibbard & 
Railton, which describes metaethics as “remarkably rich and diverse”. Smith attempts to 
explain why this is the case: 
 
In my view, the reason can be traced to two of the more distinctive features 
of morality, features that are manifest in ordinary moral practice as it is 
engaged in by ordinary folk. The philosopher’s task is to make sense of a 
practice having these features. Surprisingly, however, these features pull 
against each other, so threatening to make the very idea of morality 
altogether incoherent” (Smith 1994 p. 4-5)  
   
So, what exactly are these two features, and how do they “pull against each other”?  The first 
feature is objectivity. Morality, by appearance, is an objective enterprise. When we make 
moral judgments—for example about actions—we are making objective claims. Or rather, we 
can say that we are assigning a truth-value to objective moral propositions. If we judge the 
proposition that “X is morally wrong” to be true, we seem to not simply make a claim about 
what we like, but a claim about an independent world of moral facts. It is true that we 
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sometimes also use objective-sounding language to describe what we like. We can say things 
like “chocolate is good”. How is this claim different from the (moral) claim that “helping 
those in need is good”?  The distinction between likes and moral judgments is roughly that it 
is impossible to convince others of the objective truth of a like. Whether or not one likes 
chocolate is a matter of taste. There is no rational argument to be made that would change a 
persons like of chocolate. It is still an unresolved question whether any claims employing the 
terms “good” or “bad” is really open to change by rational argument, or if they are all matters 
of taste. However, in ordinary moral practice we observe disagreement and the use of rational 
argument to convince each other of the truth-value of various moral propositions. In doing so 
we don‟t—indeed can‟t—ground the objectivity of our claim in our own subjective feelings, 
but rather we refer to what we might call moral facts taken to be independent of any particular 
person. It is precisely the existence of moral arguments and the insistence on the objective 
truth of one‟s own believes that allows us to distinguish moral questions from questions of 
taste. Smith summarizes this objective feature of morality as follows: 
 
“We seem to think that moral questions have correct answers; that the 
correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts; that moral facts 
are wholly determined by circumstances; and that, by engaging in moral 
conversation and argument, we can discover what these moral facts 
determined by circumstances are.” (Smith 1994 p. 6)      
 
* 
 
The second feature of morality is about moral motivation. Again this is a feature we observe: 
Having made a moral judgment, fully believing this to be objectively true, the judge finds 
himself motivated to act on the judgment. To be clear, such motivation doesn‟t have to be 
overriding, because the judge can easily have stronger motivation to do something else. We 
can say that having made a moral judgment, the judge finds himself with a motivating reason 
to act in accordance with the judgment, and that he will act on the judgment in the absence of 
conflicting motivating reasons. Judging terrorism to be wrong, for example, somehow entails 
being motivated to refrain from terrorism. This is not some arbitrary definition of moral 
judgments, which could be otherwise; this is what distinguishes a moral judgment from a 
factual judgment of empirical reality. Smith very appropriately says that discussing whether 
or not X is morally right seems equivalent to discussing whether or not one has a reason to X. 
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So, by coming to believe that X is morally right, one simultaneously accepts that one has a 
reason to X, and thereby being motivated to X, at least in the absence of some other 
overriding motivation (Smith 1994 p. 6-7). Without this feature morality would be quite 
uninteresting, as it would fail to have practical implications. Consider by comparison a regular 
belief about the world, for example “diamonds are hard”. In stark contrast to moral 
judgments, this belief by itself entails no reasons for action. It isn‟t normative. If the judgment 
that “terrorism is wrong” did not entail a reason to refrain from terrorism, it would be 
unproblematic to say things like “sure, I believe terrorism to be wrong, but I would really like 
to scare some people by blowing up a building, and I don‟t see any reason why I shouldn‟t”, 
and the entire purpose of engaging in moral discourse would be lost. Smith summarizes the 
second feature as follows: 
 
“Moral judgments seem to be, or imply, opinions about the reasons we have 
for behaving in certain way, and, other things being equal, having such 
opinions is a matter of finding ourselves with a corresponding reason to act.” 
(Smith 1994 p. 7)      
 
* 
 
Accepting the first feature—the objectivity of moral judgments—has two important 
implications. The first implication is the psychological implication that moral judgments 
constitute a kind of mental state which can be objectively true or false. This means that they 
have propositional content about reality that can be either true or false. The philosophical 
position encapsulating this core claim is called cognitivism. The second implication is the 
metaphysical implication that there exists a realm of moral facts, capable of justifying at least 
some of our moral propositions (more or less the same way that the proposition “snow is 
white” is justified by the fact that snow is white).  
Explaining these two implications corresponds to the two tasks I listed in the 
introduction, and as I said, Harris must do this without compromising the motivational feature 
of moral judgments, in order to establish moral realism. 
Accepting the second feature of morality—the motivational feature—has implications 
of its own. Believing something to be morally right necessarily provides the agent with a 
reason to act accordingly. This implication is—as we have seen—absent in the case of 
ordinary factual believes. This implication must be a part of both the explanation of 
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cognitivism and of moral facts. In explaining cognitivism the challenge is to show how 
reasoning can change the agent‟s desires in the cases of moral judgment, when it seemingly 
can‟t in cases of similarly expressed judgments of taste. What I take to be the more difficult 
challenge is to explain how there can be moral facts capable of achieving these changes in 
motivation. The success of the two tasks ahead depends to a large extent on how plausible 
their incorporation of the motivational implication is.  
 
* 
 
Why do we think it is problematic to give a coherent account of moral judgment explaining 
both these features?  A moral judgment—as just described—in part aims to represent a true 
aspects of (moral) reality and in part expresses the agent‟s desire for the object of the 
judgment. This makes moral judgments look like a composite mental state, part belief and 
part desire. An initial reason to suspect that a moral judgment can‟t both represent the world 
as it is and motivate us to promote the object of the judgment is that beliefs and desires seem 
to have different directions of fit (Smith 1994 p. 116). This is a metaphor, but a useful one. 
Beliefs on this view are mental states characterized by their aim to represent, or fit, the world. 
Desires on this view are mental states characterized by their aim to conform, or fit, the world 
to their content. The content of a desire describe the future state that we wish to achieve, 
regardless of what we perceive the current state of the world to be. The content of a belief 
describes the current state of the world as we perceive it, regardless of whether or not we wish 
for this state. Consider that a moral judgment needs to describe the current state of the (moral) 
world as we perceive it. There seems to be nothing preventing different people who make 
such a judgment from having different and contradictory desires. Like holding the proposition 
“diamonds are hard” to be true is compatible with desires both to change this state and for it 
to remain, holding the proposition “caring is morally good” to be true is compatible with 
desiring to care and desiring not to care. The point is that if moral judgments are like beliefs 
in this regard their truth value is determined by matters of fact over which the individual has 
no control. As such it seems one doesn‟t have to be motivationally affected by the moral 
judgment, because one just observe that it is true. If believing that X is good doesn‟t entail a 
desire to X, the only way to secure the required motivating reason seems to be to treat moral 
judgments as expressions of desire, and desires aren‟t truth-apt, because they make no claims 
about the world.   
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The background theory of mental states that informs the problem we have just seen, is 
commonly called “the humean theory of psychology”, because its roots go back to David 
Hume (Hume 1739-1740). The central claim is that beliefs and desires are distinct existences 
and that it would be impossible for a single mental state to perform the functions of both a 
belief and a desire. Hume though that both a desire and a belief are required for action: a 
desire to secure the motivation, and a belief about how to change the world to fit the content 
of the desire. Successful actions change the world from what it is to what we desire. On the 
humean account, desires control actions while reason and beliefs only have an instrumental 
role. Even if beliefs and desires always occur together on Hume‟s account, the desire is 
always necessarily prior to the belief, which leads Hume to say that moral judgments aren‟t 
truth-apt. 
Hume‟s argument and Smith‟s metaphor are very abstract, so perhaps it is better to 
explain how this distinction affects moral theories in practice. An appropriate example is the 
normative moral theory known as utilitarianism which originated with Jeremy Bentham 
(1780) and John Stewart Mill (1863). Like Harris, utilitarians are consequentialist who hold 
the moral status of actions to depend (in some way) on the consequences on the action. 
Utilitarians define moral value as the maximization of total well-being, and claim that an 
action is the morally right action if it is the action that causes the most total well-being as a 
consequence. This simple premise allows utilitarians to identify the morally right action in 
any situation is so far as they are able to accurately calculate the consequences of the 
available actions. Because such calculations are factual and scientific, there will in each case 
be an objective answer to the question “what is the right thing to do?”.9 These results could be 
shown to anyone who would have as little reason to doubt them as they would to doubt that 
life on earth is carbon based. Based on what has been said, we can see that the belief that “X 
causes the most total well-being” is not sufficient to motivate those who come to (correctly) 
believe it to act so as to produce X. We can for example easily imagine that the action which 
maximizes total well-being will harm at least some people. A simple calculation reveals that 
an action which subtracts fifty percent from the well-being of half the population and doubles 
the well-being of the other half will increase the total well-being by 25 percent. Half the 
population is in this case harmed and it strikes us as strange if they became motivated to act in 
this way simply by recognizing the truth that the action maximizes total well-being. 
                                                 
9
 There are several substantial problems with performing such calculations in practice, as the aforementioned 
“Three Mile Island effect” is supposed to show.  
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Peter Singer, who is perhaps the most influential contemporary proponent of 
consequentialism, lends his full support to the humean distinction between beliefs and desires 
(Singer 1981 p. 72-86), which he describes as the “best known tenet of modern moral 
philosophy: the doctrine that there is an unbridgeable gulf between facts and values, between 
descriptions of what is and prescriptions of what ought to be.” (ibid p. 73) 
 Utilitarianism is a cognitivist theory, since it claims that moral judgments are beliefs 
about matters of fact. Another cognitivist theory which suffers the same problem is John 
Rawls‟ theory of “justice as fairness” (Rawls 1971/1999). Rawls argues that the right action is 
the one that secures a just society, according to his principles of justice. We see that it is 
entirely possible to recognize that X has this effect while at the same time desiring to live in a 
society with inequality and competition. Because of the possibility of accepting the moral 
judgment but not desiring to act on it, cognitivists typically reject that moral judgments 
themselves are motivating. This rejection follows from accepting both cognitivism and the 
humean theory of motivation. If moral judgments are beliefs, which are distinct existences 
from desires, and incapable of being motivating, then the required motivational aspect of the 
moral judgment must be secured by something other than the moral judgment itself. These 
different cognitivist theories must of course somehow explain why it is that everyone has a 
motivating reason to act in accordance with their particular answer to moral questions.  
One alternative is to reject cognitivism and accept that moral judgments are desires. 
By doing so non-cognitivists have no problem explaining why people are motivated to act on 
the moral judgments they make, but they have to concede that moral judgments can‟t be true 
in the traditional sense. Yet another alternative is to reject any deep distinction between 
beliefs and desires, and claim that moral judgments constitute a special “composite” class of 
mental states, which are both representational and motivational. By doing so one would have 
to convincingly explain the link between accepting a factual claim and then necessarily be 
motivated to act in a certain way.  
The point of this chapter has not been to argue that it is impossible to produce a 
coherent explanation of morality, but that it is very difficult, given the conceptual problems 
described. The fundamental distinction between beliefs and desires seem very plausible, as do 
both the objective and the motivational feature of morality, as they each seem to be the best 
available explanation of real and observable phenomenon. Smith‟s analysis of the 
disagreement in metaethics concludes that since each of the major positions in meta-ethics 
reject at least one of the two features of morality, or the belief/desire distinction, they are all 
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“bound to end up denying something that seems more certain then the theories they 
themselves go on to offer. Moral nihilism quite rightly looms.” (Smith 1994 p. 13). 
 With this in mind, I now turn to Harris‟ theory. I will return to the moral problem later, 
to see how that problem appears in the context of Harris‟ approach.  If it turns out that Harris 
can provide an attractive response to dilemma Smith describes, than I think we ought to count 
this as a significant point in his favor.     
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Chapter 3: Natural Value 
 
 
 
This chapter and the next consider a naturalist version of cognitivism, and aims to establish 
that judgments of value (evaluations) are representational and truth-apt mental states, upon 
which reasons for actions are contingent. It does so by way of a naturalist theory of value 
which is the focus of this chapter. The purpose of this theory is to define the concept of value; 
what it is, where it comes from and how we come to know it. In addition to providing a 
naturalistic definition of value, it is also a semantic account, since it involves claims about 
what fixes the reference of our evaluative terms like “good” and “bad”. The account attempts 
to show that by performing evaluations—including moral judgments—we are in effect 
making claims about reality, thus indicating that evaluations have propositional content, and 
further that abandoning one‟s belief in the propositional content will cause one to abandon the 
evaluation as a whole. This account will also attempt to explain how some evaluations—
judgments of personal value—can be considered objectively true. The question of whether or 
not moral judgments can be true is saved for later, because the answer to this question will 
depend on what we mean by “moral”.  
The account of natural value is developed form a perspective of naturalism. 
Naturalism is not a clearly defined philosophical position. It involves a rejection of the 
supernatural—vaguely definable as causes we in principle can‟t have empirical knowledge 
about—but this rejection is compatible variety of ontological and epistemological positions 
(see for example Papineau 2007). Harris‟ version of the theory of natural value builds on a 
view of the universe as deterministic and a causally closed system, which is especially evident 
in Harris‟ treatment of the question of free will (ML p. 102-6, Harris 2012). The only required 
ontological premise is the possibility of the reduction of mental states, like desires, beliefs and 
evaluations to states of the brain, and further to causal physical processes.
10
 The account of 
natural value could be rejected if our desires bore no relation to our physical brains and bodies 
and were constituted outside the causal structure of the universe and as such were principally 
outside our empirical reach.
 I don‟t consider this a very plausible model of reality, and as such 
not a serious objection. 
                                                 
10
 I am not sure if the possibility of full reduction is actually required for the theory to work. It might be 
sufficient to accept that the mental supervenes on the physical, in such a way as to allow us to establish reliable 
correlations between the physical structure of nervous systems and mental content. Harris clearly supports full 
reduction, but doesn‟t discuss the technicalities involved. 
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* 
 
The account itself starts from a premise which Harris takes to be self-evident, that 
“consciousness is the only intelligible domain of value” (ML p. 32). This formulation is 
somewhat vague. What we get out of this formulation is that the existence of value depends 
on the existence of consciousness, but it doesn‟t specify how. The point that Harris wishes to 
make is that only to conscious organisms can something matter. The important distinction is 
between material structures to which nothing can be said to matter (such as rocks) and 
material structures capable of caring (such as humans). This distinction is at the level of 
capability; some structures have the capacity to care, and some don‟t. Harris undoubtedly 
thinks of caring as a conscious capacity. Organisms which simply react to their environment 
but lack conscious experience don‟t really care on Harris account. The capacity to have 
positive and negative experiences caused by internal or external factors seems to be what 
Harris is after. This capacity is the capacity to value. From now on I will call a conscious 
organism with the capacity to value “agent”.  
Inherent in the concept of valuing is a dichotomy consisting of positive and negative 
value, “good” and “bad”. As soon as an agent values X, necessarily the negation of X (~X) 
becomes something to be avoided. Without speculating in what an agent values in particular, 
Harris asserts that everything which is really valuable to the agent is constitutive of its “well-
being”. This suggests that an agent‟s ultimate goal is to secure its well-being. In fact it could 
not be different. It would be impossible to an agent to value its own suffering; suffering being 
the negation of well-being. What is “good for” an agent is thus to be in a state of well-being, 
and what is “bad for” an agent is to be in a state of suffering, independent of what causes 
these states.
11
   
Harris‟ definition of well-being and suffering is distinct from traditional concepts of 
well-being and suffering holding them to be natural properties like pleasure and plain, like is 
the case with the aforementioned utilitarianism of Bentham (1789) and Mill (1863) as well as 
most later versions of the theory. It is a common critique of such theories that it is possible for 
                                                 
11
 We should note that this position is similar but not identical to the position known as psychological egoism. 
Psychological egoism is the position that humans are always motivated by self-interest. Harris‟ position 
addresses the physical—or structural—level of the organism, while psychological egoism addresses the 
psychological level. It is in principle possible on Harris account that a human organism is so constituted that 
helping another organism in need is genuinely conducive of the well-being of the helping organism. At the level 
of psychology this organism would experience a genuinely altruistic motivation. Harris‟ position is more similar 
to the idea of “the selfish gene” (Dawkins 1976/2006). Genes must be “selfish”, or they wouldn‟t get selected. 
The various organisms that genes are responsible for, however, can be programmed to be truly altruistic. 
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an agent to value pain and to recent pleasure. Such a critique does not work against Harris. In 
case an agent values pain, the experience of pain is included in Harris‟ concept of well-being 
for that agent.  
The “open question argument” (Moore 1903) is one formal version of this kind of 
critique. It claims that no natural property (such as pleasure) can be equated with the property 
of “goodness”, because it will always be meaningful to ask whether any particular instance of 
pleasure is good, and so “pleasure” is not analytically equivalent to “goodness”. Harris can 
similarly say that it is meaningful to ask whether any particular instantiation of a natural 
property or phenomenon is conducive of well-being, without questioning the goodness (or 
“well-beingness”) of well-being itself.  
Well-being is nevertheless a natural property. Given the naturalistic premise that mental 
states are identifiable by their physical underpinnings, an organism in a state of well-being 
will look different to science than an organism in a state of suffering, at the physical level. It 
can be hard to pinpoint exactly what Harris means by well-being, except that the term refers 
to the physical states of agents that the agents experience as positive and “values”. 
Philosopher, and one of Harris‟ critics, Russell Blackford contributes the following 
observation:  
 
“When the drift of the argument presses [Harris] towards defining well-
being, he says that he is not talking about feelings of pleasure; instead, he 
tends to invoke ideas of deep satisfaction or fulfillment.” (Blackford 2010) 
 
Harris‟ consequentialism gives us a good idea of what he means by “well-being”. Positive and 
negative experiences—roughly characterizable as “well-being” and “suffering”—are lawfully 
caused by events in the world on Harris naturalistic account. This makes them consequences. 
“Feelings of pleasure” are consequences of events in the world, and so are feelings of 
“satisfaction or fulfillment”. I think that Harris wants to argue that agents are finite beings, 
composed of finite material parts, which can be arranged in a finite number of configurations. 
Some of these configurations involve the experience of well-being and some involve the 
experience of suffering. When external events affect the organism, it doesn‟t result in a single 
change of state, but can be seen as starting chain reactions lasting until the organism dies. 
Taking a drug can cause intense pleasure at first, but the effects of this pleasure on the 
physical structure might cause a lasting state of suffering.  As such there is in principle a 
metric for measuring well-being in individual organisms. Given sufficient empirical 
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knowledge about the structure of the organism and how it is affected by external causes, we 
could predict how much total well-being will result from a given cause. 
 I think Harris‟ characterization of “well-being” is very similar to the concept of 
homeostasis. The structure of a human organism only allows for a limited number of possible 
configurations of this structure. Rearrange the material parts outside these configurations and 
the structures breaks down, and with it the possibility of value. Human bodies typically needs 
to hold a certain temperature, have a beating heart, and so on. As fellow neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio (2010) points out, an experience of well-being seems to correlate with the 
structure of the organism being in a homeostatic state. According to Damasio, the nervous 
system of our ancestors at some point evolved a monitoring function of the structural state of 
the body, allowing the body to take action when the necessary internal conditions for 
continued existence were threatened. As these organisms evolved consciousness, the internal 
states of the body became represented by experiences of well-being and suffering, depending 
on how close the body was to optimal homeostatic conditions. This explains Harris talk of 
well-being as “deep satisfaction or fulfillment” as opposed to mere pleasure, which is 
sometimes conducive to homeostasis and well-being, and sometimes not. The fact that 
homeostasis is experienced as well-being is contingent, as we can imagine organisms with 
entirely automated regulatory functions, whose experience of well-being is entirely 
determined by other factors. Even so, the possibility of experiencing well-being would depend 
on maintaining homeostasis. The point is that the experiencing of well-being—which is 
valuable on Harris‟ account—depends on the agent being in one of a limited number of 
possible physical configurations, and it is as such these physicals states which are valuable.        
We can say all this simply by observing agents, without making any claim as to what in 
particular causes well-being or suffering in the agents. Peter Railton shares this view, and 
explains it like this: 
 
“It seems to me that notions like good and bad have a place in the scheme of 
things only in virtue of facts about what matters, or could matter, to beings 
for whom it is possible that something matter. Good and bad would have no 
place within a universe consisting only of stone, for nothing could matter to 
stones. Introduce some people, and you will have introduced the possibility 
of value as well. It will matter to people how things go in their rock-strewn 
world.” (Railton 1986b p. 47). 
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The above definition of value, in conjunction with the premise that mental states are reducible 
to (in principle) observable physical processes allows us to show three things, which I will 
now outline. We can reject value absolutism; we can reject value subjectivism and relativism; 
and we can establish a version of value relationalism. This value relationalism will be 
foundational for the later account of moral truth. 
 
* 
 
“Value absolutism” is the view that value is determined independent of particular agents, so 
as to be objectivity valuable, or valuable to all conscious organisms capable of valuing. The 
above theory of value does not by itself rule out value absolutism, but it demands that if there 
is an absolute value it must be the case that all agents will value it. This line of argumentation 
is familiar from Kantian ethics. Kant himself argued that all rational agents are ends in 
themselves, meaning that the value of their existence is absolute (Kant 1785). Kant‟s 
methodology does involve truth claims held to be true a priori—independent of any empirical 
knowledge—and does of course stand in stark opposition to empiricism, which underlies the 
account of natural value. Classical utilitarianism also argues for a form of absolute value, 
which is compatible with empiricism. Much like the theory of natural value argues, pleasure 
and the avoidance of pain, are taken to be the ultimate values for agents. However, 
utilitarians—as we have seen—typically go on to claim that maximizing the total amount of 
pleasure is an absolute value, and the moral (as opposed to personal) worth of any action is to 
be determined by this principle, known as the principle of utility. The theory of natural value 
can‟t justify this move, unless we knew as a matter of fact that every single agent cared for 
this maximization, even at the expense of their own pleasure and fair treatment. We would 
have to be able to show that the well-being of every agent includes the maximization of total 
well-being.  
 Both Railton and Harris recognize the possibility that agents can be differently 
constituted. On earth alone there are many different species of agents. The only criteria given 
so far for something to qualify as an agent is that it has the conscious capacity to value. The 
relevance of cognitivism and of moral truth does however depend on the agent having a 
cognitive capacity; a capacity to form beliefs. To simplify the discussion, “agents” will now 
refer only to organisms with such a capacity and be short for “moral agents” or “rational 
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agents”. I will assume that the human species is the only species of such agents.12 Even so, the 
possibility that agents can be differently constituted remains. Human beings are similar, not 
identical, and we know that human beings are motivated to pursue different ends. As Railton 
puts it: “What in particular will matter, or could matter, to […] people will depend upon what 
they are like.” (Railton 1986b/2003 p. 47). Neither can we rule out the possibility of radically 
differently constituted species of agents living on other planets. As long as we can‟t prove that 
all agents are sufficiently identical to value exactly the same thing, we must reject value 
absolutism and stop looking for absolute values.  
 
* 
 
Value absolutism is often seen as a central part of realist theories. If we don‟t accept that there 
is something which really is valuable to everyone it is sometimes difficult to see how moral 
realism could be true, and how we can avoid lapsing into moral relativism. This two-sided 
debate is for example represented in “Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity” (Harman & 
Thompson 1996). Moral relativists, like Harman, share the rejection of value absolutism with 
Harris and Railton. They claim instead that the values we observe people to be motivated by 
are subjective. We choose them for ourselves, much in the same way that normative moral 
theorists—such as utilitarians, virtue-theorists or Kantians—can be said to choose a 
foundational value which they think (usually for good reasons) apply to everyone. Since 
everyone choose their own values, moral relativism can explain the motivational feature of 
moral judgments. Those who accept utilitarianism value the maximization of total well-being, 
while other can choose to value other thing, like the virtues kindness and benevolence. We 
can observe that people have many different basic values, including but not limited to the 
values suggested by the dominant philosophical theories. Relativists claim that none of these 
basic values are objectively right or objectively better than any other. However, the moral 
judgments that people make are said to be either true or false relative to these different basic 
values, or “moral frameworks”. For example, the judgment that “X is morally good” is true 
relative to a utilitarian moral framework, if X is conducive to the most total well-being, but 
false relative to a Kantian framework, if X is in conflict with a moral duty. Because our own 
moral framework is salient to us as judges, and our judgments can be said to be true relative to 
this salient framework, relativists can explains why we (mistakenly) claim that our judgments 
                                                 
12
 Since the rational/moral capacity is an evolved feature, we expect to find, and do find, at least precursors to 
human rationality, as well as moral behavior, in other animals. 
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are objectively true; we are making an honest and natural mistake. Moral relativism is thus a 
form of value subjectivism.  
 This is significantly different from what the theory of natural value claims. Upon 
rejecting value absolutism, the theory of natural value does not resort to a subjectivist 
explanation of values. Determining if X is valuable to a given agent does not require that the 
agent first subjectively choose his basic value or values. X will be valuable to the agent if the 
agent is so constituted that X is conducive of his well-being. He is not free to choose whether 
or not to value X. His “choice” is constrained by the particular way in which X affects him. If 
X causes him suffering, then he can‟t value X. Railton explains that while the theory of 
natural value “denies the existence of absolute good, it may yield an objectively determinate 
two-place predicate „X is part of Y‟s good‟” (Railton 1986b/2003 p. 49). 
Let me attempt to clarify. A person consists of physical matter in a particular 
configuration, just like everything else in the universe, and there are facts to be known about 
how this matter is affected by the various particular objects and events (X) external to it. 
Well-being might be a phenomenological state, but it is still instantiated in the physical agent, 
and more importantly it is caused by these external events according to lawful physical 
processes. An agent can believe that well-being is a consequence of the object or action he has 
a desire for, but he could be wrong, even about his most basic values. No one is born with 
knowledge about what is constitutive of their well-being. We are borne with certain 
dispositions and instincts which will automatically arouse in us desires to act and respond in 
certain ways. But we are not borne knowing whether or not acting on these instincts is good 
for us, in our current or future circumstances. We have to learn such things. Like many other 
species, humans can learn of such consequences by conditioning, and unlike other species we 
can also learn through the cognitive acceptance of facts. So, the claim is not that agents 
making value-claims are consciously aware what propositions they are making. The claim is 
that: Once we form the belief, or otherwise learn, that acting on a desire causes suffering and 
not well-being, we lose our motivation to act on it, and will cease acting on it. All the facts are 
out there to be experienced, observed and mapped, although conscious organisms have 
varying and often very limited abilities to do so. 
We can reject relativism and subjectivism, because value-claims are not about what is 
actually being valued subjectively (what the agent can be said to have choosen), but about 
whether or not what is being desired is really conducive of well-being. The core claim of the 
theory of natural value is that the value of a particular object or event (X) is determined by the 
relation between X and a particular conscious organism (A). X is valuable to A if X stands in 
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a certain relation (so as to cause well-being) to A. The theory is therefore relational. What is 
and isn‟t valuable to A is therefore a matter of objective facts, that serve as truth conditions 
for his value-claims. As we saw, this does not mean that the theory is absolutistic, because we 
can only determine the value of X to a specifically constituted agent or identical agents. Two 
agents who are differently constituted would not stand in the same relation to X. As long as 
we can‟t show it to be necessary that all rational agents stand in the same relation to X, we 
can‟t claim that X has absolute value.  
This leads us to the question of what exactly claims of moral value are on this account. 
Does a claim of moral value have to be absolutistic?  Do we have to show that X is valuable 
to all possible moral agents for it to qualify as moral value?  Ultimately Harris‟ moral theory 
is about the reality of moral value, and I will further discuss what he takes this to mean in 
chapter 5. We will not be surprised to find that it is a claim about the relation between a 
generalized human kind and the world. Before doing so I will in the next chapter consider if 
the theory of natural value can indeed establish cognitivism, without compromising the 
motivational aspect of value judgments, and how it deals with the distinction between beliefs 
and desires.   
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Chapter 4: Facts and Values   
 
 
 
The theory of natural value claims that judgments of value are both truth-apt and intrinsically 
motivating. From what we saw of the moral problem, this means that the distinction between 
(truth-apt) beliefs and (motivating) desirers is being challenged. This is correct, and in this 
chapter I will address this issue. I will not be talking directly about beliefs and desires, but 
about facts and values, which for the purposes of this discussion is the same distinction, using 
different terms. That value relationalism by itself provides a great challenge to the fact/value 
distinction is a claim shared by both Railton and Harris, but it is Railton who provides the 
clearer philosophical explanation, and I will specify this claim here. Harris provides two other 
claims against a fundamental distinction between facts and values, which I will also consider. 
One is related to the account itself and to the further theory, and one is a new and separate 
argument derived from Harris own neuroscientific research. But, first let‟s make sure that the 
theory of natural value can claim both cognitivism and internalism.   
I start by considering if the theory of natural value is indeed cognitivist. We must 
acknowledge that “the moral problem” addresses cognitivism about moral judgments, but the 
theory of natural value seeks to establish cognitivism about judgments of value in general, in 
particular judgments about the value of X in relation to a single agent (A). This seems like a 
problem, because we could in principle accept that judgments of personal value were 
cognitive, while retaining that judgments about moral value simply were expressions or 
projection of our personal value onto the world. We could accept that when I judge X to be 
valuable to me, this involves me believing that X really is constitutive of my well-being. But 
that claims about moral value involves no further believes. I don‟t think this problem actually 
arises from the theory of natural value itself. The theory does not demand that agents 
consciously recognize the propositions—about the effect of acting on the desire on their well-
being—underlying their judgments of value. The point is rather that such propositions are 
implied, and when the agent comes to believe the proposition is false, the motivation changes. 
We can say, along these lines, that when an agent having judged X to be morally valuable, he 
comes to believe that X in fact causes the suffering (the negation of well-being) of everyone 
but himself, his moral conviction will change, and he will stop trying to convince others that 
X is valuable to them. Logically he can‟t believe that X is both conducive to their well-being 
and suffering, as we saw. He could however believe that X causes everyone physical pain, but 
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that pain is conducive to their well-being, in which case his moral conviction would hold.
13
 If 
moral judgments are about what is valuable to everyone—what really matters to them, what 
their good or their well-being consists in, what they would be motivated to do—then a belief 
that something is not conducive to well-being will prevent one from judging it morally good.  
 The theory of natural value states quite directly that judgments of value are beliefs 
about whether or not a desire is conducive of well-being. We desire well-being, and every 
particular thing in reality is either conducive to it or not, and thus valuable or not valuable to 
us. It is straightforward enough on this account that desiring X does not by itself constitute a 
reason for pursuing X. It must be combined with the acceptance of the proposition that X is 
conduce if one‟s well-being.  
We realize that this does not in any significant way violate the standard humean theory 
of motivation. A desire (for well-being) constitutes our fundamental motivation, and the 
theory of natural value argues that it could not be otherwise. This desire for well-being is not 
a contingent desire; it isn‟t a desire for anything in particular. “Desire” might not even be the 
appropriate word. To say that caring agents desire well-being is to acknowledge the fact that 
events in the world are capable of affecting the agent in ways experienced by the agent as 
well-being or suffering, good or bad. Discovering which events are conducive of well-being, 
and how to initiate such events, are instrumental tasks to which we apply reason based on 
empirical observation of how the agents are affected by the events. It is by reason we 
determine the value of any particular thing (X) for agents, after carefully observing the effects 
of X on the structure of the agent. We were led to believe by “the moral problem”, that since 
instrumental reason only discovers facts and result in representational beliefs, it couldn‟t 
possibly reveal value.  
The reason why the theory of natural value works is the rejection of value absolutism. 
It is Peter Railton who points this out (Railton 1986b/2003 p. 47). There seems to be no 
fundamental distinction between facts and values when values are seen as relational. In we 
mean for the fact/value distinction to separate facts from values at the ontological level, thus 
creating a form of fact/value dualism—which is precisely what the humean theory of 
                                                 
13
 If an agent has judged X to be morally valuable, and then comes to believe that X causes physical pain to 
everyone, but also happens to believe that physical pain is conducive of well-being, his moral conviction would 
not change. This could occur because of a belief in things like the cleansing effects of pain, or a belief that pain 
in this life causes well-being in the next.   
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motivation attempts to establish, as we saw Smith argue—we must accept value absolutism as 
a premise.
 14
    
According to Railton, we arrive at fact/value dualism if we accept reason 
instrumentalism, internalism (the claim that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating), as 
well as demand that values be absolute. We can‟t use reason instrumentally to establish that X 
is absolutely and intrinsically valuable to all agents, but we can use reason instrumentally to 
establish that X is intrinsically valuable to a particular agent, because we know that the agent 
must care for something, and we can use reason to determine what that is.  
The rejection of fact/value dualism is central to Harris‟ entire project, and to naturalist 
ethics in general, because it allows us to treat values as facts (and motivating desires as 
beliefs) which in principle places them under the domain of scientific observation and 
instrumental reason, what Harris takes to be the “larger effort to form true beliefs about events 
in the world” (ML p. 195, en. 1). Rejecting value absolutism might seem like a heavy price to 
pay for moral realists, however, because we can no longer argue that X is absolutely and 
objectively valuable and as such exerts a normative force on all agents. Perhaps there is good 
reason for having value absolutism as a (hidden) premise in the moral problem. But 
recognizing value absolutism as a dead end allows us to explore other and possibly scientific 
solutions to our moral problems. 
 
* 
 
Harris specifies three reasons rejecting any deep distinction between facts and values (ML p. 
11). The first reason reveals that he shares Railton‟s rejection of fact/value dualism on the 
back of treating value as relational: “(1) whatever can be known about maximizing the well-
being of conscious creatures—which is, I will argue, the only thing we can reasonably 
value—must at some point translate into facts about brains and their interaction with the 
world at large;”. This is the essence of the theory of natural value, and I have said enough 
about that for now. We can note that the reason is ontological. It explains value as a real 
phenomenon in the physical universe, and rejects the possibility that something can be 
valuable unless it is an ontological fact that it matters to agents. Consider with Harris that 
something “cannot affect the experience of any creature (in this life or in any other). Put this 
                                                 
14
 It can still be useful to distinguish facts from values for many purposes—like we distinguish the mind from the 
brain—even if these turn out to be the same at the most fundamental level.  
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thing in a box, and what you have in that box is—it would seem, by definition—the least 
interesting thing in the universe.” (ML p. 32).  
The second reason is an epistemological reason: “(2) the very idea of “objective” 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge acquired through honest observation and reasoning) has values 
built into it, as every effort we make to discuss facts depends upon principles that we must 
first value (e.g., logical consistency, reliance on evidence, parsimony, etc.);”. This is meant to 
blur the fact/value distinction even further. Much of the discussion of the fact/value 
distinction, is about the problem of going from the empirical “is” to the moral “ought”, that is 
to logically move from facts to values. What Harris wants to point out is that we can‟t get to 
“is” without relying on “ought”. This reason is very interesting, because it reminds us of our 
subjective viewpoint and or limitations as seekers of true knowledge. At first it might even 
seem like this reason works against its purpose, because it seems to block the necessary 
acquisition of a motivating reason for action following the acquisition of empirical “facts” 
about X‟s conduciveness to an agent‟s (A) well-being. I have said that such “facts” determine 
the value of X for A, and that A upon believing such facts has a reason for action. However, 
in case A does not value logical consistency, reliance on evidence, parsimony, etc., the 
scientific facts alone might entirely fail to convince him of the scientifically determined value 
of X. This does not affect the theory of natural value itself, since not valuing science would 
simply cause the agent to not challenge the propositional content underlying his value in light 
of scientific evidence: He would still believe that X really isn‟t valuable. In Railton‟s version 
of the theory of natural value, he doesn‟t assign science the determinative role that Harris 
does and this, I think, causes a difference in their subsequent theories of what would 
constitute moral value. Railton imagines an agent (A) judges X to be valuable to himself, and 
asks what would cause him to change his belief that X is in his interest (Railton 1986a, 
1986b). As we saw, in case A does not value science, empirical evidence will fail to change 
his belief. Railton introduces the hypothetical A+, a version of the agent (A) who has full 
knowledge of the consequences of all A‟s possible action on his well-being. A+, being a 
future version of A, will be concerned that A does the right thing, and so A will trust in (or 
value) the advice of A+. Railton does however demand that A+ be fully rational, and it is hard 
to imagine how this is not simply to attribute the values of science and reason to A+. Harris 
attempts to remove the subjective perspective from the picture entirely. He argues that: 
 
“To really believe [a] proposition is also to believe that you have accepted it 
for legitimate reasons. It is, therefore, to believe that you are in compliance 
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with certain norms—that you are sane, rational, not lying to yourself, not 
confused, not overly biased, etc.” (ML p. 14)        
 
Again, this is an implied belief. Everyone initially seems sane to themselves from their 
subjective point of view. It is when one comes to believe that one has been insane, biased or 
confused when forming a belief, that one starts to doubt the belief. So if A believes that X is 
conducive of his well-being, but comes to believe that the formation of this belief was due to 
say the confirmation bias, his value-judgment fails to provide him with a motivating reason 
for action. This is as such a second order belief, underlying both moral and factual beliefs. 
Knowing all there is to know about air and water for example, one could not believe that air 
was the denser of the two, unless one had a false belief about one‟s own rationality. If this is 
the case it seems we can blame the failure of a scientific fact to motivate on the agent having a 
false second order belief, insofar as we can establish a common standard and common norms 
of rationality. The point is that facts in all areas of knowledge, not only in the moral domain, 
depend on values, and that this according to Harris helps to undermine any deep distinction 
between facts and values.  
 I will address one further issue in this chapter, the third reason Harris gives against the 
fact/value distinction: “(3) beliefs about facts and beliefs about values seem to arise from 
similar processes at the level of the brain: it appears that we have a common system for 
judging truth and falsity in both domains.”. This is a conclusion from Harris‟ own research on 
beliefs (ML ch. 4, Harris, Sheth & Cohen 2008, Harris et.al. 2009). The experiment was done 
by placing subjects in an fMRI scanner and asking them to evaluate the truth of various 
propositions from several domains, including both ethics and mathematics. The questions had 
three types of answers: true, false or indeterminate. It turns out that the same areas of the brain 
are activated when we judge a mathematical proposition as true as when we judge a moral 
proposition as true. In fact this goes for propositions from all areas tested, and for false and 
indeterminate answers as well. It is unclear what exactly these result shows, and I shall 
therefore not focus too much on them. Harris himself takes them to be a clear argument for 
accepting cognitivism over non-cognitivism (ML p. 225 en. 35). Non-cognitivism does assert 
that judgments of value—judgments that motivate—must be (primarily) desires, whereas 
judgments about matters of fact must be beliefs. This distinction is—as we saw—strictly 
conceptual, and it is hard to tell what, if any, differences between these judgments would be 
evident at the level of the brain. However, the striking similarity in processes involved in the 
generation of both types of judgments could easily be taken as support that judgments of 
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value include propositional content which is judged to be true. If we accept at face value that 
moral judgments are motivational as well, as they appear to be, this might at least help shift 
the burden of proof from those who reject fact/value dualism (since the distinction is not 
evident in our observations) to those who claim it is real.  
 All in all I think that the rejection of fact/value dualism is well supported by the 
material I have presented so far. I also think the account of natural value appears very 
plausible as an explanation of value judgments, including both their truth-aptness and their 
ability to motivate. There are of course several competing positions which can also—by the 
looks of it—explain value judgments. All these accounts do in themselves provide a challenge 
to the theory of natural value by comparison. I think the theory of natural value could claim 
an advantage by being an entirely naturalist approach to the problem, and unlike non-
cognitivist explanations, it can explain how value-judgments are truth-apt as well as 
motivational. We have, however, rejected the possibility of absolute values, which means that 
there is still a long way to go if we want to show that moral judgments can be true while also 
being normative for all humans, who do—as we know—subscribe to different values, even 
with access to the same empirical data. I now turn to discuss how our concept of “moral 
value” fits into the theory of natural value. 
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Chapter 5: Moral Value 
 
 
 
What kind of theory is the theory of natural value?  Is it a normative theory, a descriptive one, 
or both?  It certainly is descriptive. It asserts—based on observation—that human beings are 
material organisms who are lawfully affected by external causes. It asserts that some external 
objects and events lawfully cause suffering in human organisms and some external objects 
and events cause well-being in human organisms. Which objects and events causes suffering 
and which causes well-being (and which has no effect) is entirely dependent on how the 
organism is physically constituted because this again determines how it responds to external 
factors. Suffering refers to the various possible internal states that the human organism will 
act so as to avoid, and well-being refers to the various possible internal stats that the organism 
will act so as to produce. Being in a state of suffering produces the unpleasant experience of 
suffering or misery in the organism and being in a state of well-being produces the pleasant 
experience of well-being or satisfaction in the organism. There are several ways for organisms 
to initiate behavior that will avoid suffering and produce well-being. The behavior can be 
“hard-wired”, as is the case when humans entirely non-cognitively removes their hand from 
hot stoves. We can have dispositions towards specific or less specific behaviors, meaning we 
experience motivation to say punch people we don‟t like without considering the 
consequences on our well-being. We can learn to avoid things like poisonous mushroom, even 
when they look almost identical to nourishing ones. The point is that once the organism forms 
the belief that any action is conducive to its well-being or to its suffering, these beliefs are 
action-guiding in the sense that the organism will act on them. The claim that Harris wants to 
make is that it is impossible for human beings to knowingly act so as to produce their own 
suffering. These are all descriptive claims, but these descriptive claims help fix the reference 
of value-claims. We know (at least accept) that A will perform the actions that he believes
15
 
are conducive of his well-being. It will therefore make no sense for A to claim that what is 
valuable to him is anything but his well-being and the objects and events conducive to it.
16
 
We also know that it is a matter of fact—on the physical level—what objects and actions are 
                                                 
15
 Explicitly or implicitly.  
16
 Once again, this does not constitute psychological egoism, because A could believe that purely altruistic 
behavior is conducive to his well-being, and he could in principle be correct.  
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conducive of A‟s well-being. A‟s claim that X is valuable to him, really is the claim that “X is 
conducive to my well-being” which is a claim about physical matters of fact.  
 When asking what is the morally right thing to do, it seems we are typically not 
interested in knowing what is in our own best interest to do or what is of personal value to us. 
What is the difference between the claims “X is valuable to me” and “X is morally valuable”? 
The theory of natural value doesn‟t straightforwardly tell us what we mean by moral value-
claims. “The Moral Problem” however helps us define moral value. A moral judgment—as 
we remember—is both about matters of fact and it must provide the judge with a motivating 
reason. How does this definition fit into the theory of natural value?  
 Consider that A makes the judgment “X is morally valuable”. In order for this 
judgment to provide A with a motivating reason for action, the theory of natural value tells us 
that A must believe that X is conducive to his own well-being. We can therefore say that the 
moral judgment “X is morally valuable” entails the value judgment “X is valuable to me”. As 
we have seen, judging something to be morally valuable—as opposed to just valuable for 
some given organism—is to judge that everyone who makes the judgment (which you believe 
is objectively true) also has a motivating reason to act in accordance with it. By the terms of 
the theory of natural value this seems to mean that a moral judgment can only be the judgment 
that “X is conducive to the well-being of everyone”. Harris says that “when we believe that 
something is factually true or morally good, we also believe that another person, similarly 
placed, should share our belief.” (ML p. 14). I take it that this is what Harris thinks we are 
doing when making moral judgments: generalizing from our own belief that X is conducive of 
our well-being to the moral belief that X is also conducive to the well-being of similarly 
situated people. My interpretation of Harris is that he supports the definition of moral 
judgments as the judgment that “X is conducive to the well-being of all human beings, 
including myself”. “X” in this case can stand for an in principle any object or event in a 
specified context. For example “drinking water is conducive to the well-being of all humans”, 
“drinking water when one is thirsty is conducive to the well-being of all humans” as well as 
“drinking water on Fridays is conducive to the well-being of all humans” are all possible 
moral judgments.  
 It isn‟t obvious that Harris wholly supports this relational definition, and this is one of 
the ambiguities I mentioned in the introduction. Harris seems to argue for two related—but 
different—conceptions of moral value in “The Moral Landscape”. The one that has gotten the 
most attention is not the relational definition, but a utilitarian definition. Thomas Nagel (2010) 
in particular attributes such a definition to Harris right from the start, and there seems to be 
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good reasons for doing so. The theory of natural value seems like a perfect backdrop for 
utilitarianism, because it argues that science can determine what is valuable to each 
individual, and as such it would be the task of science to determine what causes the most total 
well-being. 
 
“The structure of utilitarianism as a moral view suits it to someone who 
wishes to emphasize the role of scientific knowledge in settling moral 
questions, for it depends only on one simple evaluative premise, namely that 
we should do what will promote the welfare of conscious creatures and 
should not do what will diminish it.” (Nagel 2010) 
 
Utilitarianism requires us to define moral value as the maximization of total well-being. This 
definition is absolutistic, at it holds one value to be absolutely valuable, namely the value of 
the most total well-being. Even if we could somehow determine that all existing humans 
valued the most total well-being—unlikely as this is—the most total well-being would not 
qualify as binding on unborn humans—according to the theory of natural value—because we 
can‟t rule out that they might be differently enough constituted so as to not value the most 
total well-being. In chapters 6 and 7 I will explore the reasons why critics such as Nagel 
criticize Harris for relying on a non-scientific premise.  
There is however at least one very important reason why we shouldn‟t automatically 
attribute this “simple evaluative premise” to Harris the way Nagel does. Accepting an 
absolutistic principle breaks squarely with Harris scientific agenda. Even if we do in chapter 6 
and 7 find that the model of the moral landscape could be in trouble if human beings didn‟t in 
fact have a basic concern for things like other people‟s well-being and for social stability, we 
should not automatically dismiss the possibility that these concerns are contingent truths 
following from a model of scientifically determined relational human value. I think the more 
fundamental definition of moral value found in “The Moral Landscape” is the relational one, 
and that is what I will be arguing for.     
 The main problem with the relational definition is its apparent inability to render any 
moral judgments true, even if they are truth-apt. As I have defined it in this chapter, a claim 
about moral value is the claim that “X is conducive to the well-being of all humans”, possibly 
also including unborn ones. Since human beings aren‟t identical, such a judgment seems to 
involve a unique factual claim about the relation of every single human being to the world, all 
of which has to be true of the judgment as a whole to be true. I don‟t think this is the final 
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definition that Harris would want to support, and I will attempt to develop and nuance this 
definition throughout the rest of this thesis, in light of the criticisms and responses that can be 
given.       
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Chapter 6: The Moral Landscape 
 
 
 
In this chapter I present Harris‟s model of the moral landscape. The model relies on, or 
follows from, what I will call „the argument from the most possible suffering‟, which is itself 
a continuation of the logic which established the definition of personal value in a material 
universe. The argument is designed to shed light on what we can and can‟t mean by “moral 
value” in such a universe, and seeks to establish a realist concepts of moral value not unlike 
the concept of personal value, in line with the definition I outlined in chapter 5. Harris doesn‟t 
treat personal value separately from moral value, but discusses both concepts simultaneously, 
which can sometimes be confusing. My main reason for treating them separately is that the 
argument seems to work much better for personal value, which has allowed me to establish 
some of Harris‟ points about the nature of value and science role in identifying it without 
addressing the additional difficulties involved in applying the argument to moral value. This 
chapter introduces the missing pieces of Harris argument about the moral landscape, which 
includes a realist concept of moral, as well as personal, value. 
What is perhaps the most foundational premise in Harris‟ theory is the premise that all 
claims about value are really claims about the well-being of conscious creatures. I have 
explained what this claim amounts to at the level of personal value, and when we step up to 
questions about moral value no new sources of value are introduced and nothing foundational 
changes. 
 
“The concept of “well-being” captures all that we can intelligibly value. And 
“morality”—whatever people’s associations with this term happen to be—
really relates to the intentions and behaviors that affect the well-being of 
conscious creatures.” (ML p. 32-33) 
 
This is a semantic point; about where our moral terms can and do get their meaning from. 
However, many moral theories—both philosophical and religious—identify values which 
appear to have nothing to do with well-being. Perhaps most notable is John Rawls‟ already 
mentioned theory of “justice as fairness” (Rawls 1971/1999), claiming that the moral value of 
fairness runs deeper than a concern for well-being, making it our moral duty to act so as to 
promote fairness rather than well-being. This is a concern because it suggests that well-being 
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might not in fact be the only source of value. Harris‟ use of the term “well-being” suggests 
that he thinks that a concern for fairness and other actually held moral values are really, or 
result from, a deeper concern for well-being:   
   
 “At bottom this is purely a semantic point: I am claiming that whatever 
answer a person gives to the question “Why is religion important?” can be 
framed in terms of a concern about someone’s well-being (whether 
misplaced or not).” (ML p. 198 en. 9) 
 
And: 
 
“All other philosophical efforts to describe morality in terms of duty, fairness, 
justice, or some other principle that is not explicitly tied to the well-being of 
conscious creatures, draw upon some conception of well-being in the end.” 
(ML p. 33) 
 
What agents care about are the only things in existence which we can reasonably call 
valuable. Logically this means that all claims about value must somehow relate to what 
conscious creatures care about. Claiming that X is valuable—personally or morally—if X is 
the kind of thing that no one cares about, in the sense that it is conducive to no one‟s well-
being, makes no sense at all on this model. We must remember that when this theory claims 
that agents “care about” something, or that something is conducive to an agent‟s well-being, it 
doesn‟t mean subjective caring—or caring at the psychological level—but what is good for 
the material organism as a whole. Setting yourself on fire is bad for you, if you are so 
constituted as to have your well-being reduced by being burned. This is true even if the 
organism is psychologically motivated to perform such an act, which it could be for various 
reasons. It could for example (wrongly) believe that being burned brings about a cleansed 
state which is what its well-being really consist in.   
It is important to see that Harris is not arguing for or against the value of fairness, 
pleasure, justice or even purity or a duty to always tell the truth. These would be normative 
arguments of the kind we saw him make in “The End of Faith”. The model of the moral 
landscape aims to show how we must go about it if we wish to make such claims. So, in case 
these particular possible values are in fact valuable they are so because conscious creatures 
are concerned about them as a function of their biological constitution and relation to the 
world at large. It might very well be the case that the just and fair world is preferable to a 
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world in which well-being in any narrow sense (like pleasure) is maximized, but this would 
be because the inhabitants of that world were so constituted as to prefer justice to pleasure, at 
the causal and physical level. The core point is that actual norms, duties or moral 
imperatives—like Kant‟s categorical imperative—“only qualify as a rational standard of 
morality given the assumption that it will be generally beneficial” (ML p. 198 en. 10). Let me 
explain this more carefully. I think this point is pivotal, and so it is worth the risk of 
repetition, to ensure that Harris‟ point is as clear as I can make it. Any imperative, belief or 
norm that you accept as true guides you actions. If you really believe that it is right to “act 
only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a 
universal law”,17 then that is how you will act. From what we know of how human beings 
form beliefs, we know that it is possible to hold action-guiding beliefs of this sort for many 
reasons; I have mentioned that they could be caused by dispositions, by learning and by 
confirming to social norms. The fact that you are psychologically motivated to act on a held 
belief, doesn‟t tell you anything about how acting on it will affect you as an organism in your 
current circumstances. If you came to believe—for example by scientific knowledge of the 
actual consequences—that acting on the belief was conducive to your suffering, the action-
guiding belief would no longer qualify as a “rational standard of morality”. This is to say that 
any norm we can believe in—and we can believe in many—will only qualify as a rational 
standard for morality if it is in fact the case that that norm is conducive to the deeper well-
being of those it affects. If a norm was demonstrably conducive of the suffering of human 
beings this norm could not be adopted as a moral standard unless we were afflicted with false 
believes about the consequences of adhering to this norm. 
However, understanding and acknowledging (the fact) that moral value must in some 
way relate to the experienced personal well-being of agents doesn‟t take us very far by itself. 
The difficult task is to provide a satisfactory explanation as to how exactly moral value relates 
to the experienced personal well-being of agents. Harris employs the model of the moral 
landscape to explain moral value.  
 
“Throughout this book I make reference to a hypothetical space that I call 
“the moral landscape”—a space of real and potential outcomes whose peaks 
correspond to the heights of potential well-being and whose valleys 
represent the deepest possible suffering. Different ways of thinking and 
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 This is a formulation of Kant‟s “categorical imperative” from “Groundwork for the Metaphysical of Morals” 
(1785) 
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behaving—different cultural practices, ethical codes, modes of government, 
etc.—will translate into movements across this landscape and, therefore, into 
different degrees of human flourishing.” (ML p. 7) 
 
This hypothetical space is described by Harris as a continuum of possible experiences from 
the worst possible misery for everyone and various degrees of well-being up to and including 
the most possible well-being for everyone. The moral landscape results from an argument 
starting with the premise that the most possible misery for everyone is bad; morally bad. 
While being personally bad for each agent—who is in a state of the worst possible misery—it 
is also morally bad in the sense that it will be impossible for anyone to argue that such a state 
of the universe is desirable and thus valuable.  
 
“We simply must stand somewhere. I am arguing that, in the moral sphere, it 
is safe to begin with the premise that it is good to avoid behaving in such a 
way as to produce the worst possible misery for everyone.” (ML p. 40)      
 
The reason why it is safe to begin with this premise is that there is no possibility that any of 
the involved agents will desire to produce this state. The state is of course hypothetical. 
Nothing needs to be said about what this state consists in or what actions lead to it. In practice 
it could be something like simultaneously subjecting all agents to a harmful neurotoxin (ML 
p. 39). Accepting that the worst possible misery for everyone is morally bad might seem 
obvious, but it has an important logical implication: All other possible states of the universe 
are now morally better. If one finds oneself in this state of the most possible suffering for 
everyone would be morally obligated to act so as to abolish it. The most possible misery for 
everyone corresponds to the lowest depth on the moral landscape. There are many other 
valleys on the moral landscape as well. These correspond to states of the universe where all 
agents suffer, though not as much as they could. All these states are better than the lowest 
depth, but there are other types of states—the peaks—which correspond to all agents 
experiencing well-being. Any agent finding himself in a valley will be motivated to climb a 
peak.  
 Moral goodness and badness is defined within the context of the moral landscape 
independent of any particular experience of suffering or well-being. This does by no means 
mean that the model and its definitions are a priori. I think the best way to view the model is 
as a logical implication of the scientific knowledge we currently have about physical reality 
including consciousness and motivation. Even if we don‟t know what states of the universe 
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constitutes the worst possible misery and the most possible well-being we can say that there is 
a clear observable difference between these two types of state. This difference is more clear-
cut in the case of individual conscious agents. In the language of the moral landscape we can 
say that it is right for the agent to move towards peaks on the landscape, since the peaks 
involve his own well-being. The landscape itself is set independently of the agent‟s 
subjectivity, and he can be right or wrong about how to move across the landscape and 
whether or not he has reached the highest peak. But we can‟t get away from the fact about 
motivation: The agent will be motivated to move away from valleys and he will be motivated 
to move towards peaks once he recognizes where he is located.  
What constitutes “right” on this model is not the achievement of any particular state, but 
upwards movement on the suffering/well-being continuum. It will always be right for an 
agent in a particular state to move towards a state of higher well-being, and it will always be 
wrong to move towards a state of more suffering. I already covered this for individual agents, 
and I am repeating in here because the same is the case for moral value.
18
 What constitutes a 
state of well-being or suffering for a group of agents is however much less clear-cut. There 
might be states where some of the agents experience well-being and some suffering, but the 
definition of right and wrong as movement between states of suffering and well-being is still 
supposed to hold. As long as the extremes of the continuum remains possible, talk about 
moving away from the worst possible misery for everyone towards the most possible well-
being for everyone still makes sense.  
 
“Once we admit that the extremes of absolute misery and absolute 
flourishing—whatever these states amount to for each particular being in the 
end—are different and dependent on facts about the universe, then we have 
admitted that there are right and wrong answers to questions of morality.” 
(ML p. 40) 
 
We can imagine states where all agents suffer and we can imagine states where everyone 
experiences well-being. It will thus always be morally right to move towards states where 
                                                 
18
 We might think that once we figured out what was valuable for every single agent, there would be no need to 
introduce the concept of “moral value”. If we accept that personal value is normative for every agent, and it is 
“right” for them to act on it, we seem to have arrived at a version of moral egoism. Figuring out additionally that 
a group of agents share some value doesn‟t seem to change the motivation of any of the members, or how it is 
“right” for anyone to act. However, moral discourse just is to identify moral values, even if a moral value just is 
a value shared by all humans. For now we are trying to figure out if there are such moral values.  
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everyone experiences more well-being then they do in the current state, and morally wrong to 
move towards states where everyone suffers more.  
 
“Grounding our values in a continuum of conscious states—one that has the 
worst possible misery for everyone at its depths and differing degrees of 
well-being at all other points—seems like the only legitimate context in 
which to conceive of values and moral norms.” (ML p. 41) 
   
The model of the moral landscape doesn‟t promise to solve all moral disagreement.19 It argues 
that the various ways we can conceive of moral value are constrained by the naturalism and 
cognitivism that are imposed. We can‟t give a full account of what in particular is valuable 
before we have full scientific information about the causal structure of the universe and how 
the various actions available to us affect well-being, but even today there are a few actions we 
can clearly conceive of as conducive to the well-being or suffering of everyone and therefore 
morally good or bad.  
 
“The fact that it might be difficult to decide exactly how to balance individual 
rights against collective interests, or that there might be a thousand 
equivalent ways of doing this, does not mean that there aren’t objectively 
terrible ways of doing this.” (ML p. 42)    
 
These “terrible ways” are all morally worse than the contenders for what is “best”. I have now 
presented the basic model of the moral landscape, and added some nuance to the relational 
definition of moral value. Moral judgments are true—on this account—if the action they 
judge good produces a state of the universe which is further away from a state of the most 
possible suffering for everyone and closer to a state of the most possible well-being for 
everyone. There are however some serious problems with this model which must be 
addressed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Moral disagreement will be discussed in detail in chapters 9 and 10.  
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Chapter 7: Considering a Principle of Maximization 
 
 
 
This chapter will begin to answer questions about the model of the moral landscape. Is it 
actually possible to talk of moral value in the context of the moral landscape—as I have 
described it—while relying only on scientific knowledge?  Answering this question will give 
us a better insight into what kind of theory the moral landscape amounts to.  
The first thing I will do is to reveal what can seem to be a critical flaw in the logic of the 
moral landscape. The moral landscape is described by Harris as the continuum between the 
worst possible misery for everyone and the most possible well-being for everyone. Everyone 
presumably has a motivating reason to move away from the worst possible misery and 
towards the most possible well-being. Such movement seems inherent in the concept of 
motivation. The ability to care means that there are some things you want to avoid and some 
things you want to bring about. Exactly what one is motivated to pursue changes with one‟s 
beliefs about how actions affect one‟s body. Ultimately a caring agent must care to experience 
well-being—as we have defined it—and adjust his contingent desires accordingly. We can 
know that any given agent necessarily would be motivated to avoid the most possible 
suffering for everyone, and he would be motivated to act as to bring about the most possible 
well-being for everyone. We can know this because both these hypothetical scenarios include 
the agent himself. In the last chapter I quoted Harris saying that: 
 
“Once we admit that the extremes of absolute misery and absolute 
flourishing—whatever these states amount to for each particular being in the 
end—are different and dependent on facts about the universe, then we have 
admitted that there are right and wrong answers to questions of morality.” 
(ML p. 40) 
 
This passage actually admits that the existence of moral truth depends upon there being 
possible states of absolute misery and absolute well-being (or flourishing, by which Harris 
seems to mean the same) and that there is a distinction between these states. If we substitute 
the last word “morality” for “personal value”, this passage neatly summarizes the theory of 
natural value. I have argued, with Harris and Railton, that it is in principle possible to 
determine which states of the universe constitutes the maximum well-being, and the 
44 
 
maximum suffering for a particular agent (A). I have explained that the reason why this works 
is that A can‟t contradict himself. He can‟t for example value something that is conducive to 
his suffering. Given a that A is the only existing agent there could only be one—either 
positive or negative—relation between A and all possible objects and events (X) that affect A. 
As such X would be either valuable or not, in fact X would even qualify as morally valuable 
by being valuable to all existing agents.  
 For particular agents the distinction between well-being and suffering is pretty clear-
cut. The idea that each agent‟s well-being and suffering can be maximized seems very 
plausible. Given that the universe is material and lawful, as it appears to be, it also seems 
plausible that science in principle can determine what these states consists in for each agent.  
Now, introduce another agent (B), and this scheme changes. Questions of morality are 
about what all human agents have motivating reason to pursue. We must therefore ask if, and 
how, the hypothetical states of absolute well-being and absolute suffering mentioned in the 
Harris quote can apply to all human agents. Clearly we can‟t rule out the possibility that there 
are possible states where both A and B experience suffering (morally bad) and states where 
both experience well-being (morally good). However, we also can‟t rule out the possibility 
that there are no such states. Because A and B are not identical, it is a possibility that X is 
conducive to A‟s well-being while at the same time being conducive to B‟s suffering. It seems 
like the logical possibility that there is no state which can be called good and no state which 
can be called bad will remain. To keep things simple, consider that X is involved in A‟s 
maximized well-being and in B‟s maximized suffering. Given this logically possible scenario, 
there could not be states of “the most possible suffering for everyone” and “the most possible 
well-being for everyone”. There might not even be any states where both A and B experience 
well-being, if A and B are sufficiently different. It might even be the case that A‟s suffering is 
conducive to B‟s well-being, and vice versa. 
 The point I wish to make here is that any vague definitions of absolute, maximized or 
most possible well-being and suffering will not suffice. The model simply fails to establish 
the existence of moral truth without making more explicit claims as to what is involved in the 
states we are all supposedly motivated to move away from and towards. One way to do this—
as we have seen—is to define the states in terms of the most aggregate well-being and 
suffering. This would mean setting as a criterion for the morally right action that it is the one 
which produces the most total well-being all agents considered.  
 It remains unclear to this day whether or not Harris makes this move. There certainly 
are passages in “The Moral Landscape” where Harris appears to show full commitment to a 
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principle of maximization, but then again the general argument in the book—especially 
Harris‟ persistent insistence on the foundational role of science—strongly indicates that he is 
not willing to accept such a principle. The philosopher Troy Jollimore clearly identifies 
Harris‟ confusion on this point is his review of the book: 
 
“At times [Harris] seems to use "consequentialism" simply to imply that the 
consequences of an action, in terms of conscious creatures' well-being, are 
what determine that action's moral rightness or wrongness. This is a quite 
modest view that is compatible with all sorts of accounts of how such well-
being matters. (For instance, the claim that I should always maximize my 
own self-interest, and not be concerned with anyone else's well-being, is in 
this sense a consequentialist view.) But at other times he goes much further, 
seeming to suggest that he has somehow established that the consequences 
must matter in a certain way: well-being in the universe at large (and thus 
not simply my own well-being, or that of myself and those I care about) must 
be maximized—even where doing so involves violating the basic rights of 
some particular person, or sacrificing the few for the sake of the many.” 
(Jollimore 2010) 
 
Jollimore points to Harris‟ discussion of Robert Nozick‟s thought experiment regarding so-
called “utility monsters” as the strongest evidence for Harris acceptance of a principle of 
maximization. Utility monsters are a hypothetical species of moral agents who would receive 
great happiness from devouring the human species; comparatively much greater than the 
suffering that humans would receive in being devoured. Obviously, humans would suffer as a 
result of such an interaction. Given what has been said about consciousness and motivation, it 
seems impossible that humans be motivated to be devoured given only the true belief that 
aggregate universal well-being would be increased as a consequence. Harris nevertheless 
outright supports such an act of self-sacrifice as morally good: 
 
“Nozick [. . .] asks if it would be ethical for our species to be sacrificed for the 
unimaginably vast happiness of some superbeings. Provided that we take the 
time to really imagine the details (which is not easy), I think the answer is 
clearly "yes." There seems no reason to suppose that we must occupy the 
highest peak on the moral landscape.” (ML p.211 en.50, quoted by Jollimore 
2010)  
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The critic who sees Harris most clearly as a utilitarian is perhaps Thomas Nagel, who spends 
little time dwelling with the mentioned ambiguity and states quite directly that “Harris is a 
utilitarian, in the style of Mill”, although he admits that it can occasionally “sound as though 
Harris is denying the distinction between facts and values altogether” (Nagel 2010). This gets 
right at the point. Being a utilitarian, and accepting the principle of utility, just is to accept an 
evaluative premise—a value—conceptually prior to any scientific knowledge. It is to define 
“the most total well-being” as an absolute value, independent of what any particular conscious 
agents actually value. It is Nagel‟s claim that Harris is committed to the truth of an irreducible 
value judgment that specifies which facts determine the difference between good and bad, 
right and wrong. 
 The most extensive review of “The Moral Landscape” comes from Russell Blackford, 
who also—perhaps legitimately—attributes an evaluative premise to Harris: 
 
“Harris overreaches when he claims that science can determine human 
values. Indeed, it’s not clear how much the book really argues such a thing, 
despite its provocative subtitle. Harris presupposes that we should be 
motivated by one very important value, namely the well-being of conscious 
creatures, … .” (Blackford 2010)   
 
The reason why Blackford thinks Harris presumes this value is because he sees it as the only 
way Harris account can be logically coherent. 
 
“There might be a determinate, objectively correct answer to what maximizes 
global well-being, but no such answer to the ancient questions, “How am I to 
act?” and “How am I to live?” It’s these questions that really matter, if we’re 
looking for guidance for our actions.” (Blackford 2010) 
 
We are starting to see even more clearly why it is insufficient to simply say that morality is 
about the well-being of conscious creatures. There are several different ways to care about the 
well-being of conscious creatures. Blackford points out that we can ask “Why, for example, 
should I not prefer my own well-being, or the well-being of the people I love, to overall, or 
global, well-being?” (2010). This is basically what Harris must explain. When facing a moral 
dilemma, where one course of action increases only your personal well-being and another 
course of action increases global well-being: How is one to act?  If we acknowledge that 
different people have different interests; that is, if we can somehow know that different 
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actions really are conducive to the well-being of different people, how are we to identify the 
morally right action in a given situation?   
So, what if Harris is a utilitarian, and accepts a principle of maximization as part of his 
theory?  It certainly would satisfy the need for a clearer definition of what is involved in the 
morally valuable state which we are obligated to direct our actions towards. However, there 
are many problems with attributing such a principle to Harris. Accepting an evaluative 
premise of this sort is not compatible with the rejection of fact/value dualism. As Blackmore 
(2010) goes on to show there is nothing irrational or self-defeating about an agent who 
doesn‟t act so as to increase global well-being given that he simply doesn‟t value global well-
being. In other words, he is not doing anything wrong. Accepting a principle of maximization 
on rational grounds also seems to defeat Harris scientific agenda. Science is not showing us 
that it is right to prioritize global well-being over other kinds of well-being. Finally, Harris 
doesn‟t to any relevant extent address or deal with the well-known problems associated with 
the acceptance of such a principle. This leads Nagel—who is under the impression that Harris 
is a utilitarian—to conclude that “Since Harris skips over the hard substantive questions of 
right and wrong that occupy moral philosophers, the book is too crude to be of interest as a 
contribution to moral theory.” (Nagel 2010).  
Accepting the principle of utility and then go on to not discuss the implications seems 
strange, and it would indeed make Harris theory philosophically uninteresting. For these 
reasons I don‟t think that Harris really intends to employ a principle of maximization as a 
premise in his theory, and that such an interpretation overshadows the real issues. Addressing 
the issue, as I have done in this chapter, has nevertheless identified and specified the 
explanatory challenges Harris is facing. The challenge then is to find a different explanation 
as to how the well-being of conscious creatures matter. If it is not as simple as the morally 
good world being the one with the most aggregate well-being, then what is this state we are 
motivated to move towards?      
I will in a later chapter return to the issue of global well-being, as I do think that this 
proposed value occupies a central part of Harris moral theory, much like the critics points out. 
I do however not think that it occupies the role of an absolute and logically prior value, but 
can rather be considered a „human value‟ pertaining to the human kind qua our common 
human nature and our circumstances. As such this value doesn‟t go into the grounding 
framework of the moral landscape, but follows from it and contributes to making it a useful 
version of moral realism.  
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I now turn to the more direct arguments for how to understand the concept of moral 
value, which hopefully will bring us closer to what I take to be Harris‟ final definition of this 
concept.     
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Chapter 8: The Analogy with Health  
 
 
 
So far I have attempted to come to terms with Harris‟ moral theory. I have laid out his core 
arguments with as much philosophical accuracy as I think can be done with a basis in “The 
Moral Landscape”. My aim—as I stated in the introduction—has been to see if this theory fits 
into the framework of contemporary meta-ethics and can qualify as a legitimate version of 
moral realism, like Harris claims it is. But we have run into trouble. I have explained what 
Harris thinks of value, and arrived at the position that all claims about value are really claims 
about the well-being of conscious creatures. This is clearly a consequentialist position, but as 
Harris‟ critics correctly point out, this by itself leaves us wondering how X must affect the 
well-being of conscious creatures for X to count as morally good. The answer we have seen 
Harris give to this question seems insufficient. The answer is roughly that X needs to move all 
human being towards a state of the most possible well-being for everyone or away from the 
state of the most possible suffering for everyone. This corresponds to the characterization of a 
moral judgment as the value judgment “X is conducive of the well-being of everyone”. We 
have established that such a judgment is truth-apt, because the well-being of each material 
organism is lawfully affected by X, but can such a judgment possibly be true?  What does it 
take for us to be able to say that X is conducive to the well-being of everyone, or moves 
everyone towards a state of maximized well-being?  
 When asked how to justify the truth of the kind of moral value-claims he has been 
arguing for, I think that Harris parts with what he seem to regard as the “philosophical 
confusion” of traditional meta-ethics. From what we have seen of the critique against Harris, 
it seems that before we can say that X is conducive to the well-being of everyone we need to 
specify in concrete terms what we mean by “the well-being of everyone”, and this could be 
for example “fairness”, “the most total well-being” or “virtuous character”. Since we 
allegedly can‟t show by scientific means that any of these particular possible values really are 
conducive to the well-being of everyone, we must rely on an evaluative premise; we must 
accept them based on non-scientific justification. The reason why we supposedly can‟t 
observe X to be conducive to the well-being of everyone is—as we have seen—that we can 
never rule out that at least one human or future human will not be so constituted as to value X. 
Harris has no objections to this logical possibility, and as we remember, this was precisely the 
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point given as an argument against value absolutism and for the rejection of fact/value 
dualism in the theory of natural value.  
What Harris objects to is the claim that because we can‟t observe X to be valuable to all 
humans, we can‟t hold X to be morally valuable and we can‟t hold that X provides everyone 
with a reason for action (making it wrong for them to act against it), unless we accept non-
scientific assumptions. This claim would be plausible in case values were subjectively 
determined. If A‟s values are determined by his subjectivity, independent of the physical 
constitution of the organism as a whole, we couldn‟t predict whether or not X will be valuable 
to A based on empirical observation.
20
 But values on Harris account are relational, determined 
by the objectively available relation between a valuing organism and objects and events in the 
world. Knowledge of the structure of a given organism will therefore allow us to predict what 
is valuable to it, and with increased knowledge comes greater accuracy in our predictions.  
 Consider now that we observe that X causes in the nervous systems of everyone it 
affects a state which we know—also through observation—correlates perfectly with well-
being. That is we know that whenever a person‟s nervous systems displays this particular 
configuration the organism is motivated to maintain it, and we know that X systematically 
causes this state in people. We can predict that X will continue to do so in all future cases, but 
we can‟t of course know for certain that this prediction will hold.  Consider that X is the act of 
taking a drug which enhances intelligence. The prediction we are making—based on a large 
amount of data—is that taking this drug is conducive to the well-being of every human. The 
objection—that we can‟t be certain that the prediction will hold—amounts to saying that it is 
always an open question whether or not X will be good for, or conducive to a well-being of, a 
given person. We remember Moore‟s open question argument from chapter 3. The argument 
is supposed to show that we can never equate the property of “goodness” (or in Harris‟ case 
the property of “conduciveness to human well-being”) with any natural property, such as 
enhancing intelligence. While this might in the strictest sense be true, it doesn‟t matter for 
moral truth on Harris‟ account. In our example, it seems that A has a motivating reason to X, 
just in case he values empirical evidence. What Harris wants to emphasize is that if science 
tells us that X systematically causes well-being in humans, than they have as good a reason 
for acting on X that they have to believe (and act in accordance with) the proposition that 
water is denser than air and other similarly established scientific facts.  
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 I have already conceded that the theory of natural value could be rejected if values are constituted outside the 
causal structure of the universe and as such were principally outside our empirical reach. The account depends 
on the supervenience of the mental upon the material, and the possibility of reducing values to their physical 
underpinnings.        
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There is one branch of science which Harris considers analogous to what a science of 
morality would look like, and that is medicine. Moral truth, on Harris‟ account can be 
understood by analogy to medical truth, where moral goodness is analogous to good health, 
and different actions and practices are considered morally good, just as some actions and 
practices are considered healthy.      
Relying on an analogy to prove one‟s points can sometimes be risky. In Harris‟ case I 
think the use of the analogy with health is a good way to demonstrate some points which it 
might otherwise be very difficult to explain. As Harris admits, the analogy isn‟t perfect, but 
he asserts in his response to critics (Harris 2011) that it is good enough to obviate the 
criticisms commonly wielded against his theory, like the ones I have just discussed. I don‟t 
think the analogy is needed to establish any part of Harris‟ theory as I have laid it out over the 
last five chapters. The purpose of the analogy is rather to show why the kind of theory we 
have now arrived at deserves to be categorized as a genuine form of moral realism, despite its 
problem in specifying a moral “first cause”. It is thus meant to refute the claim that moral 
judgments about what is conducive of the well-being of humans in general, based on the 
relational definition of moral value, constitute a category of propositions which can‟t possibly 
be true. Medicine is precisely about making true claims about what is healthy for human 
beings in general. It is important to carefully consider if the analogy holds for the kind of 
moral questions that we are interested in finding the answer to, the sort of questions being 
debated in normative ethics, like human rights, the death penalty, obligations to future 
generations and so on. If it turns out that the hard questions of ethics fall outside the reach of a 
science of morality modeled on medicine, then we will have to consider if the analogy is 
really useful.   
 
* 
 
What exactly is health?  What does it mean to be in a healthy or unhealthy state?  By what 
criteria can we call substances or practices healthy or unhealthy?  We know, or at least seem 
to know, that being healthy has something to do with being physically fit and being free of 
disease. We also seem to have few reservations when we call practices and substance which 
are known to induce such states in humans „healthy‟ and „unhealthy‟. Are we willing to 
recognize that there is a genuine distinction between healthy and unhealthy states?  Are we 
further willing to recognize that science is the way to determine the various causes of these 
52 
 
states?  Harris answers both these questions with a clear “yes”. More importantly he is 
claiming that doing so is entirely uncontroversial; that these are obvious facts. 
 But what does it mean to be “physically fit” and “free of disease”?   If we spend only a 
short time dwelling on the meaning of these terms, we find that they are impossible to define 
with any precision. To be physically fit means something like being able to do what it is 
normal for people of the same age to do. What counts as physical fitness can‟t be defined in 
absolutistic terms. That is, we can‟t say that being able to walk a kilometer at age forty is 
healthy for all humans, always has been always will be. This feat can easily enough be 
achieved by unfit—or less than average fit—people in most parts of the world today. Not long 
ago being alive at age forty was uncommon, and as Harris points out “there may come a time 
when not being able to run a marathon at age five hundred will be considered a profound 
disability.” (ML p. 12). A clear difference between the ability to walk a mile and the lack of 
such ability nevertheless remains strong. At the extremes, “the difference between a healthy 
person and a dead one is about as clear and consequential a distinction as we ever make in 
science.“ (ML p. 12). Despite the problems with giving precise definitions of physically fit, a 
dead person can never be considered healthy.  
 The absence of disease is also a criterion for being healthy, but what constitutes a 
disease?  There are dictionary definitions defining disease as “a disordered or incorrectly 
functioning organ, part, structure, or system of the body…”.21 Of course, the notion that 
something can function “incorrectly” presumes that there is a correct way for that thing to 
function in the first place. Any strict definition of correctness will have built into it a kind of 
normativity that can‟t be observed in nature. All we can observe are bodies functioning. Often 
we will observe two bodies functioning differently, but there is nothing inherent in the 
functioning that tells us which way is “correct”. However, as long as being healthy has 
something to do with being fit and living long and free of pain we can distinguish between 
bodily functioning which supports and induces these states and bodily states which do the 
opposite. As long as people are not identical there will probably always be disputes about 
what is healthy and what constitutes a disease. The important point is that such disputes will 
be about whether or not X is conducive to health (being fit and living long and free of pain), 
and not whether being fit and living long and free of pain is healthy. It seems hard to even 
imagine someone arguing that dying in agony is healthier then living long and enjoying life. 
Or less extreme, that living with Alzheimer is healthier than not.  
                                                 
21
 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/disease (Viewed May 4th 2013)  
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 In what way is health like morality?  First we notice that the terminological framework 
is very similar. There is good health and bad health and the external factors responsible are 
healthy or unhealthy, just like there are desirable and undesirable states and morally good or 
bad actions leading to them.  
The definition of “good health” is what Harris calls “open-ended”. We don‟t know—
and probably never will—how “healthy” it is possible for human beings to be. We don‟t know 
how long it is possible for humans to live, what physical feats we can be capable of in the 
future or how much painful and disabling conditions can be reduced. Harris is suggesting that 
the same is the case with the definition of the “morally good”. Health has something to do 
with being physically fit and free of disease, and morality—on Harris‟ account—has 
something to do with being in a state of well-being and free of suffering. We don‟t know—
and probably never will—how much “well-being” it is possible for human beings to 
experience; we don‟t know what our limits are. And we don‟t know how much suffering can 
be reduced.  
Perhaps even more importantly, we don‟t know if it is possible for all humans to be as 
healthy as they can be at the same time. Perhaps it will turn out that the presence or level of a 
substance in the atmosphere will affect people‟s health differently, making some healthier and 
some less healthy. We don‟t, in other words, know what state of the universe we are aiming 
for when we practice medicine. This is also the case with well-being. We don‟t have any 
absolute, or ultimate, purpose to direct our actions towards. We don‟t know if a state where all 
humans experience as much well-being as possible is achievable. As a have argued, it is 
possible that X is involved in A‟s maximized well-being while being conducive to B‟s 
suffering. This leads Harris to believe that we can practice normative ethics without knowing 
exactly what state of the universe we are aiming to achieve, and that indeed this is the only 
way to go about it.  
What is healthy and unhealthy to an organism will depend on what it is like, like what 
is valuable to an organism. Medicine is however the study of human health, and medical 
truths are however truths about human health. At this point we can start to ask how it is 
possible to have a working science of general human health, give that we don‟t know what 
ultimate state this science is aiming to bring about, and given the logical possibility of humans 
who are so constituted as to not be bound by general health advice. One of Harris most central 
54 
 
points is that the criticism which is typically applied to moral realism—as in the moral 
problem—can with seemingly equal force be applied to what Harris calls “medical realism”.22   
Medicine is not about discovering and attributing absolute value to things in the world. 
It is not about identifying a property of “healthiness” in objects or actions, at least not in any 
strict logical sense. Medical claims do not rule out that there are or will be humans to whom 
the conclusion “X is unhealthy” does not apply. All it takes is a small biological difference for 
a person to be immune to the inhibiting effects of a generally harmful cause. Similarly, a 
small biological difference can be responsible for a person being harmed by a generally 
harmless cause. As I have showed in the case of well-being, even if we in practice can‟t 
observe any exceptions to a rule we nevertheless can‟t rule out the logical possibility that 
exceptions might exist. If medicine purported to be about the identification of absolutely 
healthy and unhealthy practices and substances binding on all humans, then the enterprise 
would likely be in vein, just like a normative morality purporting to identify absolute moral 
value. What than is it that allows us to speak of medical truths?  
We can view medicine as an effort to support people‟s health. It does so by 
prescribing treatments for disease and as well as methods for increasing ones fitness. Of 
course, there is not a separate scientific effort for each individual human, and the prescriptions 
of medicine are based on research on general human anatomy. This is very similar to what 
Harris imagines a science of morality will be about. At one point he even argues that we 
“must […] define “good” as that which supports well-being.” (ML p. 12, italics added) A 
science of morality will produce prescriptions for how to increase personal well-being and 
avoid personal suffering, based on a scientific model of a general human type.  
Any scientific model of human anatomy would necessarily allow for the variations 
that we observe in humans. We are thus dividing the notion of humanity into various traits. 
Some traits are shared by all humans: we are all carbon-based material beings and so on. We 
do however differ in many respects. The prescriptions of medicine will have different effect 
on the health of people with different traits. Prescription P
1
 might for example increase the 
health of all humans with trait T
1
, but reduce the health of people with trait T
2
. If it can be 
determined that the health of T
1
 humans will increase as a result of P
1
 in all observed cases, 
we can make the induction that P
1
 is healthy for T
1
 humans. This is a normative claim. Any 
human with the trait T
1
 will have a motivating reason to act in accordance with the 
prescription P
1
. This indicative fact will be on par with all other scientific knowledge about 
                                                 
22
 This point makes up the bulk of Harris‟ response to the critics of ML, (Harris 2011). 
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the world. In case P
1 
is the cure for a lethal disease, a T
1
 human will die by not following the 
prescription.  
The existence of various sub-types of humans, categorized by how their specific traits 
define how their health is affected by external causes is not necessary; it doesn‟t have to be 
this way. All humans could in principle be radically different, and be differently and 
arbitrarily affected by the same external cause. If this was the case then a science of medicine 
would be impossible, because we could not generate predictions of how a cause will affect 
more than one human at the time. However, as it happens, the universe is lawful, and 
similarly constituted structures are similarly affected by similar causes. Arsenic will cause a 
reduction in the health of every human who injects it. 
 How do we deal with prescriptions which affect only humans with a specific trait? 
Let‟s consider an everyday example. The judgment that milk is healthy for all rational agents 
is likely false, and so is the judgment that milk is healthy for all humans. The judgment that 
milk is healthy for (in relation to) all lactose tolerant humans is however plausible, and true 
given that milk is in fact healthy for lactose tolerant humans. We notice that no dilemma 
really arises at the sub-type level. On the level of all rational agents, and on the level of all 
humans, it would be impossible to determine a common norm for milk drinking, since milk 
has a radically different effect on members of each of these groups. The fact milk is 
conducive to the health of one large sub-group of humans and conducive to the suffering of 
others does not constitute a dilemma. In light of this scientific knowledge our choices are not 
to either ban milk (morally bad) or force people to drink it (morally good and binding). We 
can however establish that access to milk and information about milk drinking are good 
norms, because they are supportive of general health. By allowing access to milk we are 
producing and adding good consequences (increased total health) to the system, without 
subtracting from anyone‟s already existing health (because we are not forcing anyone to drink 
milk).  
So what does this analogy tell us about moral truth? We have already established that 
moral judgments are cognitive, and therefore truth-apt. In the last few chapters I have been 
dealing with the problem of whether or not any moral judgments can be true. In this chapter I 
have argued, with Harris, that in case it is true that it is healthy to cure diseases and increase 
general health, it is also true that it is morally good to support practices which only increase 
personal well-being and to remove practices which are only conducive to personal suffering. I 
do think that the analogy between health and the relational definition of moral value holds, 
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and I think that it shows that at least some relational moral judgments are in fact true, by the 
same standard that other scientific facts are true. But can it address all moral questions?  
Even in medicine there are disputes about what is healthy. Most treatments have so 
called “adverse effects”, such that they affect health both positively and negatively. 
Chemotherapy for instance has a range of seriously unhealthy effects on the body.  How 
unhealthy do the adverse effects have to get before the treatment as a whole can be unhealthy?  
The more serious problem is whether such conditions as grief or caffeine addiction are 
healthy or unhealthy. Such categorization seems to depend on what we mean by “healthy”. Of 
course, Harris acknowledges such questions remains, precisely because we don‟t have an 
exact definition of health. It is the large amount of conditions and causes that medicine can 
successfully categorize as healthy and unhealthy which supports medicine as a domain of 
genuine truth claims. In order for the analogy between health and morality to be a good and 
useful analogy, we would expect most relevant moral propositions (claims about what is good 
and bad) to be categorizable as either true or false, in the same way that most medical 
propositions (claims about what is healthy and unhealthy) are categorizable as either true or 
false. It is however still not clear whether any but the most obvious moral propositions can be 
categorized as true or false on this account.  
A science of morality modeled on medicine might have a very limited reach. What can 
be shown to be morally bad on this account might be limited to such obvious cases as 
showing that a forced mass injection of arsenic constitute a morally bad act, as it would cause 
the suffering of all humans. Nevertheless, if the theory allows us to establish any moral truths 
as all, it seems it can count as a minimal form of moral realism. The tasks I specified for 
Harris in the introduction was to (i) show that moral judgments are cognitive, and (ii) show 
that there exist empirically available truth-conditions capable of justifying at least some moral 
judgments. I think that the analogy with health helps us understand how Harris proposes to 
solve this second task. It is still unclear, however, whether or not we can develop a proper and 
useful normative theory unless it can help us resolve more than obvious cases of relational 
good and bad. It could even be argued that by “moral questions” we just mean the kind of 
questions which just can‟t be resolved in this way. Thomas Nagel seems to support such a 
view: 
 
“Harris rejects [fact/value dualism] in the only way it can be rejected—by 
pointing to evaluative truths so obvious that they need no defense. For 
example, a world in which everyone was maximally miserable would be 
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worse than a world in which everyone was happy, and it would be wrong to 
try to move us toward the first world and away from the second. This is not 
true by definition, but it is obvious, just as it is obvious that elephants are 
larger than mice. If someone denied the truth of either of those propositions, 
we would have no reason to take him seriously.” (Nagel 2010) 
 
Even if Nagel acknowledges that some evaluative propositions are obviously true, he 
doesn‟t think that any substantive or “real” moral questions can be answered without the 
presumption of a principle of maximization. Defining moral truth by analogy to health 
is then clearly only the foundational element in a “real” moral theory. In the next 
chapter I start addressing moral disagreement and consider if this “minimal” moral 
realism supports the resolution of substantial moral questions.   
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Chapter 9: Being Wrong about Value 
 
 
 
This chapter and the next address two different kinds of moral disagreement, which can be 
seen to follow from the theory so far. The first kind of disagreement occurs when people who 
share the relevant traits are simply wrong about what is conducive to their well-being. This is 
the kind of disagreement that I have claimed is solvable on Harris‟ theory. Most disagreement 
about what is healthy falls into this category and is therefore solvable, such as “does X cause 
disease?” and “will Y increase my fitness?”. As I have argued, knowledge of how people with 
various traits respond to X and Y allows us to establish norms which are supportive of health.  
 Part of Nagel‟s critique of Harris was that even if it could show that there are a few 
“obvious” moral truths, it failed to address substantial moral questions. What exactly is a 
“substantial” moral question? “Normal” moral questions are about what all humans have 
motivating reasons to do. The way I have defined it based on the contemporary moral debate, 
to claim that X is morally right is to claim that all humans has motivating reason to X, which 
means that X is conducive to the well-being of all humans. Given that Harris has successfully 
provided a model which establishes the factual moral value of certain kind of states and 
actions, he has shown that we can answer a few moral questions on this definition.  
When Gilbert Harman (1996) argues for moral relativism he argues that the 
persistence of moral disagreement despite the availability of all facts to all sides indicates that 
such disagreement is unsolvable and that no one is morally right. Such disagreement on 
Harman‟s account traces back to the involved agents having different basic values. Harman 
argues that for each moral dilemma there will always be agents who value both sides. There 
will even be some agents whose basic values support detonating nuclear bombs. This is 
interesting, because it shows that given the right circumstances even the most obvious of 
truths about what is conducive to the well-being of humans can be disbelieved. Harman relies 
on empirical evidence to support his claim. We always find at least some people or cultures 
who—despite access to all the same facts—disagrees with even the most widely accepted 
moral norms. Harman‟s core argument is that since there is no difference in the factual basis 
for the varying values, then there is no objective standard to determine which is “right”.  
The point I wish to make is that all moral questions in Harman‟s sense are 
“substantial”. As long as people in fact disagree and are differently motivated, despite access 
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to the same knowledge, it is not straightforward and “unsubstantial” to resolve the 
disagreement. In case this can be done, a substantial moral question has been answered.   
 On Harris‟ account—as we have seen—people can have different basic values, but this 
would be because they are differently constituted on the structural level. In case we can 
show—by way of science—that two or more disagreeing parties really are similar enough so 
that X has the same effect on their well-being, we have solved moral disagreement.  
 The other kind of moral disagreement is caused by people really having different basic 
values; when all parties—with full information—correctly judges different states to be the 
most valuable for them. 
 How can we know if a moral dispute belongs to the first or second category?  The 
answer is that we can‟t really know that until we have either shown that the norm or the belief 
in question is conducive to the well-being of humans and that those who fails to become 
motivated by it are wrong about the value of the desire that motivates them, or shown that the 
disagreement is caused by a difference in traits. Both projects are incredibly difficult because 
they rely on knowledge about the functioning of the human nervous system and of 
consciousness. We still have a very limited understanding of these phenomena. Given that the 
universe is material and lawful, as it appears to be, we see that such knowledge must exist, 
much in the same way that knowledge of human anatomy exists, and existed in principle even 
before it became known. We see that both these categories apply to health as well as to well-
being. It is possible to disagree about X‟s conduciveness to health, either by being wrong 
about the actual consequences X has on the human body, or because X actually have different 
consequences on different people. The science of medicine is currently much further along in 
its quest to generate medical truth then science of morality is in generating moral truth. 
Harris‟ point is that these are in principle the same projects. When people are arguing over 
whether or not cigarette smoke, wine or vaccines are healthy we don‟t automatically know if 
the disagreement is caused by people being wrong about the consequences of these particular 
substances or if the substances are in fact healthy for some and unhealthy for others. However 
once it has been established that cigarette smoke is unhealthy for all humans, the prescription 
“don‟t smoke” is normatively binding on all humans.23 We notice that it is entirely possible to 
remain delusional about the health effects of smoking. Some people will perhaps be 
convinced by the propaganda of the tobacco industry. Even if one comes to believe the 
science, quitting smoking can be close to impossible. Coming to believe that smoking is 
                                                 
23
 Normative for achieving optimal health. In moral terms it seems possible to value unhealthiness, or particular 
causes of unhealthiness, in case they are conducive of well-being in the current circumstance. 
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unhealthy provides a reason to not smoke, but it doesn‟t necessarily override the motivation 
caused by the habit of smoking. We see that the argument by which Harman wanted to 
establish moral relativism also seems to establish medical relativism. Every time medicine 
establishes that X is unhealthy there will be some people who will continue to believe that it is 
healthy, and many people will continue to practice it.  
 
* 
 
 Harris‟ spends a good amount of space discussing real life example of norms which he 
thinks qualify as morally wrong. As we have seen he means by this that those people who 
adopt the norm as an action-guiding belief are wrong about the norm‟s effect on their well-
being and the behavior prescribed by the norm is not instrumental in achieving or maintaining 
homeostasis or well-being, but has the opposite effect. A particularly striking example in the 
society created by the Dobu islanders:  
 
“Every Dobuan’s primary interest was to cast spells on other members of the 
tribe in an effort to sicken or kill them and in the hopes of magically 
appropriating their crops. […] The conscious application of magic was 
believed necessary for the most mundane tasks. Even the work of gravity had 
to be supplemented by relentless wizardry. […] To make matters worse, the 
Dobu imagined that good fortune conformed to a rigid law of 
thermodynamics: if one man succeeded in growing more yams than his 
neighbor, his surplus crop must have been pilfered through sorcery. As all 
Dobu continuously endeavored to steal one another’s crops by such methods, 
the lucky gardener is likely to have viewed his surplus in precisely these 
terms. A good harvest, therefore, was tantamount to “a confession of theft.” 
This strange marriage of covetousness and magical thinking created a perfect 
obsession with secrecy in Dobu society. Whatever possibility of love and real 
friendship remained seems to have been fully extinguished by a final 
doctrine: the power of sorcery was believed to grow in proportion to one’s 
intimacy with the intended victim. This belief gave every Dobuan an 
incandescent mistrust of all others, which burned brightest on those closest. 
Therefore, if a man fell seriously ill or died, his misfortune was immediately 
blamed on his wife, and vice versa. The picture is of a society completely in 
thrall to antisocial delusions. (ML p. 60-62)      
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The judgment of the practices and norms of the Dobu society as morally wrong, does of 
course not rely on an evaluative premise. The judgment is based on facts about human beings 
and what type of external causes result in well-being. In so far as we can prove that living 
alone and in constant fear—as is the state Harris attributes to the Dobus—will systematically 
cause humans to suffer, then the Dobu norms are really bad.  
 Harris‟ favorite example seems to be the society based on the norms of the Taliban, 
which for years now has been a prominent part of the modern world, and of which Harris has 
the following to say: 
 
“I think it is quite clear that members of the Taliban are seeking well-being in 
this world (as well as hoping for it in the next). But their religious beliefs 
have led them to create a culture that is almost perfectly hostile to human 
flourishing. Whatever they think they want out of life—like keeping all 
women and girls subjugated and illiterate—they simply do not understand 
how much better life would be for them if they had different priorities.” (ML 
p. 36-37)  
 
As we saw in chapter 2, Harris‟ agenda includes criticizing religion, and his moral theory does 
provide him with a tool for doing so. Religious beliefs that contradict scientific knowledge 
about how to improve well-being—perhaps by false promises of even greater well-being in 
the next life—are on Harris‟ account morally bad. 
 
* 
 
 As mentioned humans do have the ability to form believes about what is conducive to 
their well-being, an ability which has freed us from a reliance on only being motivated by our 
predispositions. We have of course also evolved biases in belief formation. That is, it is easier 
for us to form some beliefs than other beliefs. Michael Shermer explores the issue of belief 
formation in “The Believing Brain, How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths” 
(2011) where he for example identifies a strong tendency to attribute intentionality and 
agency to process which has none. Shermer points to the evolutionary advantage of making 
such attributions. Those who tend to form the belief that the sound from the bushes is only the 
wind will be correct most of the time but will be eaten when then sound is a lion. Whereas 
those who always think it is a lion, will never be eaten. Shermer then uses this point to 
tentatively explain various modern version of such attribution, such as gods, ghosts and 
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conspiracy theories. On the other end, forming the belief that it is correct to switch doors in 
the Monty Hall problem, even when the obvious fact is carefully explained, turns out to be 
very difficult for the human brain.
24
 Shermer‟s theory seems coherent enough, if a little 
speculative and difficult to prove. The larger point however is that such biases are real, 
regardless of how we got them. An extensive overview of cognitive biases from a 
psychological perspective is provided in Daniel Kahneman‟s “Thinking, Fast and Slow” 
(2011), which sums up the research tradition on heuristics and cognitive biases which 
Kahneman himself, together with his colleague Amos Tversky, has had a central role both in 
founding and developing over the years. This research strongly corroborates the claim that the 
beliefs human beings form in all areas of life are systematically and predictably biased.  
From the point of view of science—which we are currently occupying—the truth of a 
proposition does not depend on being believed. The fact that we systematically fail to form 
certain true beliefs and systematically succeed at forming certain false believes does not 
chance the truth-value of the propositions. Moral psychologists such as Joshua Greene—
currently the director of the moral cognition lab at Harvard university—has shown in several 
essays that our moral judgments are subject to similar biases. We are for example very quick 
to form certain believes about consensual incest and pushing fat people onto railroad tracks, 
even in scenarios where such actions are obviously conducive to well-being (see for example 
Greene‟s doctoral dissertation (2002), which Harris also references in ML).  
 One interesting theory which seeks to explain the moral judgments we do make comes 
from physiologists Jonathan Haidt and Selin Kesebir (2010), and has been discussed by Haidt 
in other works as well. They have studied the moral judgments actually made by people, and 
identified five broad categories of moral concerns:  
 
1. Harm/care: Concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring 
and compassion. 
 
2. Fairness/reciprocity: Concerns about unfair treatment, cheating, and more 
abstract notions of justice and rights. 
                                                 
24
 In the “Monty Hall problem” you are asked by a game-show host to choose one out of three doors. Hidden 
behind one of the doors is a car which you can win, and hidden behind the other two doors are goats. After 
having made your choice the host opens one of the doors you didn‟t choose and reveals a goat. He then asks if 
you want to switch to the other of the now two remaining doors. Initially you had 1/3 chance of hitting the right 
door, but if you switch you have 2/3 chance of hitting. Few people form this belief that it is right to switch doors 
without having it explained to them, and many people fail to form the belief even when they have all the relevant 
information. It is that difficult for the human brain to form this true belief.  
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3. In-group/loyalty: Concerns related to obligations of group membership, 
such as loyalty, self- sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal. 
 
4. Authority/respect: Concerns related to social order and the obligations of 
hierarchical relationships, such as obedience, respect, and the fulfillment of 
role – based duties.  
 
5. Purity/sanctity: Concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including 
virtues of chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires. 
 
 These five categories are predispositions, shared by all humans. This doesn‟t mean that all 
humans come to value these five things, rather, Haidt suggests that these five things make up 
what we can value, and what we actually end up valuing depends on the particular 
circumstances in which we grow up. The first three categories are nevertheless close to 
universal, in that everyone values them to some degree, whereas the last two categories are 
only valued by some. These predispositions have evolved to become a part of human nature. 
The environments in which the human species has evolved were quite different from the 
social and technological environment we are facing today. It is therefore no necessary 
connection between the conduciveness of these values to human well-being today. This is 
precisely the point. As long as our well-being is the goal of our actions, we need to figure out 
what is conducive of this state in our current environment. In order to do so we must see past 
our predispositions and the things we are thought to value. Our failure to convince the Taliban 
that they are wrong then, is irrelevant.  
 Note that in order to establish this conclusion about the particular norms of the Taliban 
and the Dobus, we are assuming some scientific conclusions about well-being that are not a 
part of Harris‟ meta-ethical theory itself. But what if these norms turned out to be conducive 
to the well-being of some of the Dobus or some of the Taliban? What do we do when we 
discover that a set of norms really is conducive of the well-being of some and to the suffering 
of others?    
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Chapter 10: Moral Disagreement 
 
 
 
This chapter is about how to handle the second category of moral disagreement, the kind 
caused by groups of people having different traits, thus giving them a different relation to X.  
Consider the following simple thought experiment: Two types of people—T1 and T2—
live in a world governed by the set of norms “X”, under which everyone suffers slightly but 
equally. We learn through science that the set of norms “Y” is conducive of the increased 
well-being of everyone, and is the alternative which generates the most total well-being. We 
also learn that the set of norms “Z” is conducive to the maximized well-being of T1, but 
leaves T
2
 in the state of slight suffering.   
 If we follow the objection we saw Blackford make earlier, T
1
 humans will be fully 
justified in valuing Z over Y, because Z is conducive to what for them is the most desirable 
state possible, as a matter of fact. Based on the theory of natural value, we would have to 
agree. We have already claimed that it is a fact of conscious agents that they are motivated to 
do what is in its best interest, so if a conscious agent is so constituted as to really desire a state 
which involved the suffering of others, then that is the state it will be motivated to achieve. 
There seems to be no way around this. If this thought experiment accurately represents the 
nature of moral dilemmas belonging to the second category, then I think we simply have to 
concede that science can‟t solve them. 
 But why would we think that most moral questions belong to this second and 
unsolvable category?  Isn‟t it rather reasonable to believe—based on what we currently 
know—that most moral dilemmas are caused by people being wrong about what is conducive 
to human (including their own) well-being, and as such are solvable by science?   
 What I think Harris wants to suggest is that almost all moral questions we can ask 
belong to the first and solvable category. When we carefully analyze our reasons for actions, 
the cases where a group of people are genuinely motivated to act so as to produce a state 
where another group suffers—and as such form an unsolvable moral dilemma—are very rare, 
if they exist at all. I think Harris‟ point is that there is a finite, and in fact very limited, range 
of possible norms which contribute to human well-being. Based on what we currently know 
about human nature and human circumstances we can effectively rule out norms which leave 
a group of people in suffering. 
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“It seems clear that what we are really asking when we wonder whether a 
certain state of pleasure is “good,” is whether it is conducive to, or 
obstructive of, some deeper form of well-being. This question is perfectly 
coherent; it surely has an answer (whether or not we are in a position to 
answer it); and yet, it keeps notions of goodness anchored to the experience 
of sentient beings. Defining goodness in this way does not resolve all 
questions of value; it merely directs our attention to what values actually 
are—the set of attitudes, choices, and behaviors that potentially affect our 
well-being, as well as that of other conscious minds. While this leaves the 
question of what constitutes well-being genuinely open, there is every reason 
to think that this question has a finite range of answers. Given that change in 
the well-being of conscious creatures is bound to be a product of natural 
laws, we must expect that this space of possibilities—the moral landscape—
will increasingly be illuminated by science.” (ML p. 12-13) 
 
In this paragraph Harris‟ reminds us that values are “the set of attitudes, choices, and 
behaviors that potentially affect our well-being, as well as that of other conscious minds.”. 
Nothing else can be valuable. Harris goes on to say that “while this leaves the question of 
what constitutes well-being genuinely open, there is every reason to think that this question 
has a finite range of answers.”. Even if this formulation is a bit vague, it illuminates the 
central part of Harris‟ model. I take this, and other similar statements, to mean that the 
question of what constitutes an actual material state of ultimate moral value has a finite and 
limited range of possible answers.  
Like the case is with milk-drinking, we are typically not limited to two possible 
norms—do or don‟t do—for each type of action. Many things can be done with milk which 
will typically be true of each commodity. Consider that we could select any norm for what to 
do with milk to be binding on all humans. We could of course ban milk or we could force 
everyone to drink it. We could allow milk, but not produce any. We could offer milk to 
everyone but not inform them of the consequences of drinking it. We could produce milk, and 
empty it all into the ocean. The list is close to endless. We could come up with many different 
norms for the act of murder as well. Banning it or demanding it of people are possibilities. We 
could allow murder, but randomly incinerate murderers with sky-lasers. We could allow 
people to murder each other using sky-lasers. We could murder every fifth child born. We 
cold murder criminals convicted of horrible crimes and deemed unredeemable. The point is 
that any state where people are allowed to incinerate each other with sky lasers, or where 
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every fifth child is murdered, are most likely not included in this range of states where it is 
possible for any human to flourish, based on the actual consequences of such norms. 
 
* 
 
Let‟s take a step back and start at the beginning of the method which I think Harris 
wants to claim leads us to the solution of moral disagreement. At first we observe different 
groups of people making different moral judgments. As a model of what actually happens 
when most people make moral judgment, we have said that the moral judgment that “X is 
good” amounts to the judgment that “X is good for me and similar organisms including all 
similarly situated humans”. We then try to figure out what cause the disagreement. Is the 
disagreement caused by tradition, established cultural norms, genetic predisposition or any 
other contingent factor which “trick” us into being motivated away from what really is good 
for us?  Alternatively, is there a real biological, or rather neurological, difference between the 
disagreeing groups (as it is in the example that opened this chapter), such that none of the 
groups are wrong about what is conducive to their well-being? In the latter case the 
disagreeing groups can legitimately be said to have different and opposing values, as in the 
example. So, what makes us think that this disagreement can be resolved?  
 The point I am going to make now might sound trivial, but I think it is important, and I 
believe that when we think about morality in absolutistic terms it is easy to overlook this 
simple point. If we accept that a moral judgment is the judgment that “X is good for all 
humans”, or that “all humans has a motivating reason to X in the context S”, we can see rather 
plainly that in case X really is conducive to the well-being of one group and the suffering of 
another, then the judgment that “X is morally good” is false. X is thus not included in the 
range of possible norms which is conducive to human well-being. We realize however that 
this false belief is constitutive of the moral disagreement. Consider that T
1
 humans believe 
that the set of norms “Z” is conducive of their maximized well-being and that Z is morally 
valuable. By wrongly believing that T
2
 humans also has motivating reason to Z, the T
1
 
humans fail to recognize all the consequences of Z, where it to be enforced as a moral norm. 
T
1
 humans are in this case simply not aware of the fact that they will not be able to convince 
the T
2
 humans that Z is conducive of their well-being.  
 The belief that “Z is conducive of the T1 humans‟ maximized well-being” depended on 
the false belief that “everyone has a motivating reason to Z”. Thus, in order for the value-
disagreement to remain, we have to assume that T
1
 humans remain motivated to Z, even after 
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realizing that Z causes the suffering of others.  It will remain true that the perfect state of the 
universe for T
1
 humans is the state where everyone has a motivating reason to Z and acts 
accordingly, however this state as it turned out is not a real possibility. Genuine disagreement 
about what ought to be done then can only exist as long as a group of people are so 
constituted as to be genuinely motivated to bring about a state which leaves another group 
suffering. I am not claiming that no such situations can occur, and I don‟t think Harris argues 
that either.  
We can see that if we accept the evaluative premise that the most total well-being is 
valuable to all humans—which is what Nagel takes Harris to presume—then all such 
dilemmas would be solvable. That is the point of making such an evaluative premise. If we 
merely presume that other people‟s well-being is valuable to all humans—which is what 
Blackford takes Harris to presume—we are not thereby saying how much the well-being of 
others matter compared to one‟s own or that of one‟s kin. Such an evaluative premise is 
nevertheless sufficient to make the above thought experiment incoherent: It could not be the 
case that Z was conducive to the maximized well-being of T
1
, because T
1
 would be concerned 
about the well-being of T
2
 to which Z is not conducive. We might instead find that as a matter 
of fact, when calculating in the unsatisfied concern for other people, that the compromise Y is 
the norm which is more conducive of the well-being of T
1
. This would, as mentioned, require 
T
1
 humans to relinquish their false belief that Z is morally valuable; the belief that everyone 
has a motivating reason to act in accordance with Z.  
I have been very persistent in denying that Harris‟ moral theory is founded on an 
evaluative premise, even when Harris himself seems somewhat ambiguous about the question. 
Allowing for the acceptance of such a principle reduced the theory to something like plain 
utilitarianism. As mentioned in chapter 5, I do think that the value of the well-being of others 
plays a central part in Harris‟ theory, for the reason I have just explained. By accepting that 
the well-being of others is in fact valuable to humans, we can actually rule out norms which 
are conducive to the suffering of some, and in a sense “force” compromises. We are thereby 
able to solve many of these apparently “unsolvable” moral dilemmas.   
I don‟t however think that the value of the well-being of others has the role of an 
evaluative premise in Harris‟ theory. I think that Harris considers it an obvious inductive fact 
that human beings to some extent value the well-being of others. This amounts to just the kind 
of fact that I have argued his meta-ethical theory can establish. I think Harris considers it 
equally obvious that all humans have a motivating reason to secure the well-being of others, 
as they have to not detonate a nuclear bomb, and that elephants are larger than mice. As such 
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this value is not a presumption but follows from the theory. The existence of such a value 
does not change the theory itself, but it changes its reach. The possibility that human beings 
are really capable of valuing states which include the unnecessary suffering of others 
diminishes, increasing the plausibility that moral questions fall under the solvable category. 
Thus, if the well-being of others can really be said to be a value, that might be the contingent 
fact about our nature that enables us to answer more than obvious moral questions. In the next 
and final chapter I turn to discussing whether or not we can justify such a value.     
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Chapter 11: Reconsidering a “Principle” of Maximization 
 
 
 
In the last two chapters I have discussed two different forms of moral disagreement. The first 
kind of disagreement is caused by people being wrong about what is conducive to well-being, 
including their own. This can cause people who are practically identical to disagree about 
what is conducive of their well-being. The other kind of disagreement is caused by people 
who are different, and are right about which hypothetical state their maximized well-being 
consists in. I have argued that in case people are actually different in this way, the ideal state 
for one type of people will necessarily be less than ideal for people with different values. In 
the last chapter I suggested that we have very little reason to believe that the maximized well-
being of any group of humans includes living side by side with other people whose 
motivations goes unfulfilled. It is very important to realize that this is not a presumption or a 
required premise for Harris‟ theory to work, even though Harris himself sometimes gives the 
impression that it is. That the well-being of others is a value which is shared by all human 
beings is supposed to be a fact with a similar claim to truth as the fact that cancer is 
unhealthy. Neither of these facts are absolute, since we can‟t rule out the logical possibility of 
a being that is so constituted as to not value the well-being of others or a being to which 
cancer is conducive of health. These facts are inductive, like all scientific facts. We are 
therefore equally obligated to take seriously those who claim that cancer is healthy, fire is 
chilly and the suffering of others is morally good.    
 In order for this contingent fact to be true, we do of course have to show that there are 
no exceptions to this value. Harris does argue this case in “The Moral Landscape”. His 
argument is very simplistic and as I have mentioned it does at times seem like Harris is simply 
presuming this value. In a very obvious way, all humans do have to care about other people. 
Everyone have to care what everyone else is motivated to do and what they actually do. This 
is because other people‟s actions and their reasons for them have an effect of everyone‟s 
personal well-being. This is fairly standard consequentialist reasoning. In his books on 
religion (Harris 2004 & Harris 2008) Harris argues the case that people‟s religious believes 
help shape their actions. We share a world with people of different religious beliefs and their 
actions and beliefs concern us because they affect our well-being. Harris attacks the notion 
that having faith and believing in God is a virtue, constitutive of good character and worthy of 
our praise. He attacks the notion that believing substantial truths about the nature of the 
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universe for which there is no evidence is innocent and morally unproblematic. For example, 
the belief shared by several religions about reward and punishment being distributed in an 
afterlife distorts our motivation in this life. The kind of rewards offered to Muslims for 
inflicting pain, suffering and death upon infidels—if genuinely believed—is guiding the 
actions of the believer through the maze of practical possibilities towards a miserable end for 
everyone. These books also attack the norm by which religious and other non-scientific 
beliefs about the world are allowed to flourish. Harris asks, what happens when Muslim 
extremists (or other people with extreme false beliefs about well-being, such as many North-
Koreans) gain the ability to eradicate their enemies with the push of a button, or enforce their 
views upon the rest of the world?  Why would they not use this opportunity to ensure (what 
they believe to be) the well-being of everyone?  
 All false beliefs on Harris‟ account are dangerous to various degrees if only because 
they prevent us from acquiring true beliefs about the world and about well-being. Harris‟ 
argument must not be seen as an argument against the freedom of speech or belief, which is 
an important tool in our quest to form true beliefs about the world. He is calling for serious 
criticism of beliefs that are harmful, to the believer and to others. Most such beliefs are 
condemned by societies, and the behavior they propagate is regulated. The belief that speed 
limits for cars should not exist is rightfully not thought to children and the resulting behavior 
is banned. One of the main points of “The End of Faith”, which is also one of the main points 
of Dawkins‟ “The God Delusion” (2006), is that religious believes are currently enjoying an 
immunity to criticism, a norm which is allowing dangerous beliefs to flourish. This norm is 
thus not supportive of well-being, and therefore morally bad on Harris‟ account. The point for 
the current discussion is that other people‟s actions and believes concern us. We are 
concerned that other people‟s actions and beliefs are conducive of our personal well-being.  
 This point alone doesn‟t answer our question. How is it that the well-being of others is 
conducive to our well-being? Harris does surprisingly little to answer this question directly, 
and he seems to assume that everyone is better off if the people they surround themselves 
with are satisfied. There are however several good reasons to support such an assumption, and 
I will now briefly consider a few. In chapter 9 I mentioned Haidt‟s study of moral judgments, 
which revealed that it is a close to universal concern for (i) “the suffering of others, including 
virtues of caring and compassion”, (ii) “unfair treatment, cheating, and more abstract notions 
of justice and rights”, (iii) “obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self- sacrifice, 
and vigilance against betrayal”. While Hadith‟s study reveals that we are in fact concerned 
about avoiding the suffering of others, this is merely a predisposition and, as I have argued, 
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does not show that this concern is conducive of our well-being. We are interested to know if 
this concern, that we happen to have evolved, is true.  
 Why is it that almost all of us are concerned about harm/care, fairness/reciprocity and 
in-group/loyalty, as well as being predisposed to care about authority/respect and 
purity/sanctity?  It seems that all these innate concerns function so as to generate behavior 
which again contributes to social stability. They ensure that we are motivated to take care of 
each other, to trust each other and to cooperate within our social group. Importantly we are 
also motivated to be vigilant against betrayal and to reciprocate by punishing those who 
betray and rewarding those who are loyal. We are also disposed to be motivated to follow 
leaders and to respect a hierarchical order, and we are disposed to be motivated to be civilized 
and control desires. So it seems that the moral judgments we do make all serve the purpose of 
creating and enforcing stable and reliable social conditions. 
 I have talked about Damasio‟s concept of homeostasis, which is the internal state an 
organism “wants” to be in. By “want” I am talking about the organism‟s natural “interest” in 
continued existence. These are the kind of “interest” that an organism must have in order to be 
selected for by evolution, and which we can observe in some form in all evolved organisms. 
A homeostatic state lays within a very narrow range of parameters, including such factors as 
body temperature, the presence of exactly the right amount of certain chemicals, no damage to 
the intricate physical structure of the organism and so on. External causes changes these 
parameters, and the all organisms depend on very specific environmental factors, such as the 
pretense of nutrition, specific weather conditions and so on. Damasio suggests, as we saw, 
that conscious organisms experience being in homeostasis as well-being. Naturally, other 
humans are a part of our environment, and can be a huge threat to our homeostasis. Other 
people can deprive us of food, damage us or simply kill us. Our well-being therefore depends 
on securing conditions where other people don‟t do these things, and don‟t threaten to do 
these things. Damasio introduces the term “sociocultural homeostasis” (2010 p. 308-315). Just 
as we will be motivated to secure the right internal parameters and the right environmental 
parameters, we will be motivated to secure the right social parameters. Like most internal 
states of the body and most environmental states, most states of society will not be conducive 
to the well-being of any human. We can‟t help but experience various degrees of suffering 
when our internal state and our natural and social environments changes and moves outside 
our parameters for homeostasis and well-being. Damasio also employs the term “homeostatic 
range” to describe the range of possible states—internal, environmental and social—which 
doesn‟t threaten the organism‟s homeostasis. Haidt‟s five basic human concerns complement 
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Damasio‟s theory very well. These traits have been selected for because they motivate us to 
act so at to secure our sociocultural homeostasis, at the expense of those traits that did not. 
Observing that people judge it to be good to increase the well-being of others does not 
rule out that everyone is delusional when doing so. However, observing at the physical level 
that people‟s personal well-being increases a result of helping others does rule out delusions. 
In order to make such observation we have to have some indication of what human bodies in 
homeostasis look like, so that when someone reports that he suffers greatly after having 
helped someone, we can observe his neural and other bodily processes and catch his lie. We 
are beginning to understand the neural underpinnings of well-being. In “Braintrust” (2010) 
Patricia Churchland argues that sociability is a basic value, not only for humans, but for all 
social mammals. She provides much data in support of this hypothesis, but I won‟t rehearse 
everything here. Much of her argument is centered on the hormones oxytocin and vasopressin, 
which in humans correlate with experienced well-being. The research Churchland presents 
shows that these hormones are released into the human brain following acts of caring for 
others as well as physical contact, childbirth and various other social interactions. Oxytocin 
can also be administered directly and has some interesting effects while active in the brain. 
There is a measurable increase in trust towards others and a measurable decrease in 
aggression. It is also experienced as pleasurable. If oxytocin hadn‟t taken on the function is 
has in humans the kind of cooperation and trust which is characteristic of humans wouldn‟t 
have evolved. “Sociability” is a human trait which inclines us towards pro-social behavior, 
and friendly social interactions. Such interactions reward all parties with pleasurable 
experiences and reduce hostility and aggression in those involved. I think Churchland is right 
to argue that sociability is a basic human value. Being sociable seems to be a central 
component in securing one‟s own sociocultural homeostasis, and one‟s own well-being.  
I don‟t wish to read too much into this research, or draw too broad conclusions based 
on the available results. I think there is ample research in support of the conclusion that the 
well-being of others is generally valuable to humans. I am simply pointing out the very basics. 
Harris‟ theory is in any case not dependent on any final conclusions about the actual moral 
value of the well-being of others. If we can show that the well-being of others is valuable to 
most people to some degree, and predict that it will continue to be so, we have come a long 
way towards showing that much moral disagreement can be solved. This again helps 
strengthen the analogy with health—and Harris‟ account as a whole—by showing that a 
science of morality too can successfully categorize enough condition and causes as good or 
bad to really be considered a domain of genuine truth claims. We saw in the last chapter that 
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unsolvable moral disagreement was between two groups of differently constituted people who 
both genuinely preferred a state where their particular interests would be prioritized at the 
expense of the interest of the other group. I argued that such unsolvable disagreement only 
seems likely to occur when both groups are so constituted as to not be concerned with the 
consequences of leaving the other group in a state suffering. The neglected group, we can 
speculate, is likely to feel unjustly treated, feel a need to reciprocate, deny the other group the 
benefits of their social cooperation, and so on. In effect the neglected group will to some 
degree threaten the sociocultural homeostasis, and the well-being, of the group that wish this 
suffering upon them. The stronger this threat turns out to be, the likelier it is that a 
compromise really is the most valuable alternative for everyone, that there really never was an 
unsolvable moral disagreement and that the disagreeing parties were just wrong.      
One group of human beings at least nevertheless seems to provide an exception to this 
general valuing of the well-being of others. Sadistic psychopaths certainly share traits which 
distinguish them significantly from the rest of the human population. It seems fitting to end 
my treatment of Harris‟ moral theory by discussing what may be the most prominent threat to 
any kind of moral realism, and see if the theory we have arrived at can deal with the case of 
sadistic psychopaths.
25
  
When sadists claim that they are motivated to torture and kill innocent people, it seems 
we have every reason to believe them. But is the state of the world where sadists get to kill 
and torture at will actually best for them?  We can perhaps assume that an arrangement where 
the sadist was free to do whatever he liked without there being any consequences would be 
preferable to the sadist. Of course, this would probably be true for everyone else as well. 
None of these are actual possibilities. No one is free to do what they like, because actions do 
have consequences. In order to determine if torturing and killing innocent people really is 
valuable to the sadist we have to take into account the reactions this behavior will create in 
other people. I would like to make the uncontroversial observation that when a sadist tortures 
and kills someone, and threatens to repeat such behavior, all affected humans—arguably also 
including other psychopaths—must become motivated to remove the threat by some means, 
and likely also will become motivated to execute revenge on the sadist. Thus, by torturing and 
killing innocents the sadistic psychopath is not only causing himself pleasure, but he is also 
risking “everything” else that he cares about, so to speak. As I have said, in case people are 
                                                 
25
 By this I mean people who are so constituted as to lack empathy and to derive pleasure from cruelty and the 
infliction of pain. This is primarily a thought experiment and doesn‟t address the deep complexities of sadism or 
psychopathy. For an interesting discussion of these traits and their relation to our concept of “evil” see for 
example Simon Baron-Cohen‟s “The Science of Evil” (2011).  
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concerned with avoiding torture, death, imprisonment and other social sanctions it is fair to 
say that actively provoking others is not the best way to secure such a state, sadists are no 
exception. It is possible that some sadists realize this, they are after all not lacking in 
cognitive functions. The urge to kill might be like a drug addiction, which the sadist can‟t 
resist but which causes him suffering because he knows what he is forsaking.   
 This doesn‟t rule out the possibility that the sadist‟s desire to torture and kill is so 
strong, and the received pleasure so intense, that it is worth forsaking the benefits of living in 
peace with society. The sadist‟s deeper well-being could in principle consist in knowing that 
he has tortured and killed many people. It might even consist in being on the run from 
punishment and retribution. Again, this will depend on what the individual is like. Would 
such an individual constitute an exception to the fact that all humans to some degree value the 
well-being of others?    
 We can‟t, according to Harris, think of maximized personal well-being in terms of 
what the individual is actually like at any particular time. Sadistic psychopaths are human 
beings, but they have a trait (the lack of empathy) which is determinative of what is conducive 
of their well-being. Because of this trait, this group of people are unable to experience the 
deeper well-being associated with being in sociocultural homeostasis, available to other 
humans. They are as such prevented from reaching the peaks of human well-being. An 
extreme, but appropriate, comparison could be a person in coma. Could we really say that 
since this person is so constituted as to be in a coma—perhaps his state happens to be caused 
by a brain tumor—he is in a state of maximized well-being and health?  Because of his 
physical constitution this person is prevented from being motivated to change his state. It 
seems uncontroversial to say that it is in this person‟s interest to have the tumor removed. We 
are determining how healthy this person is and how much he flourishes, not by what his 
current physical constitution allows for, but by how healthy he can potentially be and how 
much well-being he can potentially experience as a human being. As long as we know that his 
health or his well-being will increase as the result of even a physical alteration of the body, 
we can say that he has a motivating reason do so. His comprehension of the benefits of such a 
procedure is irrelevant to his reason.  
 It is a small point that we can‟t—at least not yet—cure psychopathy, but the fact that 
we can‟t cure a physical disease doesn‟t prevent us from truthfully stating that the sick 
individual is not healthy. We can compare psychopathy and sadism to physical disease as long 
as we can prove that people who have these traits aren‟t experiencing as much well-being as it 
is possible for humans to experience. Psychopathy can be seen as the name for the condition 
75 
 
one has when ones‟ empathic ability is working incorrectly, provided we acknowledge that 
the correct way is to secure homeostasis and maximize well-being.  
 The purpose of this chapter has been to consider the role that the value of other 
people‟s well-being plays in Harris theory. Since Harris‟ focus on the value of well-being in 
general has been misinterpreted as an evaluative premise, I feel that this was necessary to do. 
We know that the well-being of others is valuable to many people and I have tried to explain 
why this is, and how this helps us to solve moral disagreement, even in the case of sadistic 
psychopaths.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
“The Moral Landscape” is a different approach to meta-ethical questions. Sam Harris argues 
from a naturalist standpoint that there are objective answers to moral questions; questions that 
it is up to science to answer. My main goal in this thesis has been to consider whether Harris’ 
theory has the resources to face up to the explanatory challenges found in contemporary 
meta-ethical literature, and whether it constitutes a viable naturalist explanation of morality. 
I haven‟t compared Harris‟ particular view to other alternative meta-ethical explanations of 
morality, or attempted argue that Harris‟ explanation is the best available. My focus has been 
on Harris‟ theory itself as I have attempted to show that it is a serious candidate for the  
explanation of morality, which can rise up to challenge the various existing explanations. 
More specifically, I set up two explanatory challenges for Harris: (i) Showing that moral 
judgments are truth-apt mental states, like beliefs, and (ii) showing that there exist empirically 
available truth-conditions capable of justifying at least some moral judgments. I also said that 
Harris must show both these things without compromising a fundamental feature of moral 
judgments, namely that they provide us with a reason for acting in accordance with them. To 
be clear, my main goal has not been to show that Harris actually and straightforwardly meets 
these challenges, but that the kind of naturalistic and scientific explanation he suggests is 
capable of meeting these challenges, and thus can‟t be dismissed as a non-starter, the way 
naturalistic versions of moral realism typically are. 
 The nature of these challenges and the conceptual problems involved in meeting them 
were elaborated in chapter 2: “The Moral Problem”. I then went on to show how Harris can 
meet the first of these challenges in chapters 3 and 4, by way of what I called the theory of 
natural value. In establishing this view I emphasized the rejection of value absolutism in 
favor of a form of value relationalism. Accepting value relationalism allowed us to reject—or 
at least seriously challenge—fact/value dualism, the view that facts and values are distinct 
existences. By doing so we could claim that values are reducible to—or at least determined 
by—observable physical and structural properties of conscious organisms, a move that is 
typically unavailable without the rejection of fact/value dualism. Harris‟ particular view—as 
we saw—is that claims about value are really claims about the well-being of conscious 
organisms, and further that the well-being of conscious organisms is caused by external 
objects and events according to lawful and observable natural processes. This means that what 
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is valuable to a given conscious organism is determined by the organism‟s relation to the 
world; the particular way that the material structure which constitutes the organism is affected 
by external events.  
I think that what is said in chapters 3 and 4 succeeds at showing that it is possible to 
establish cognitivism without compromising the motivational feature of morality within an 
entirely naturalistic framework, as long as value absolutism is rejected. An important 
conclusion from these chapters is that what is established is cognitivism about judgments of 
relational value, which as a category doesn‟t necessarily include (what we usually mean by) 
moral judgments. Success at establishing cognitivism about moral judgments will thus depend 
on whether we can accept that moral judgments are a form of relational judgments. In 
chapters 5 and 6 I went on to argue—what I take to be Harris‟ view—that judgments of 
relational value include moral judgments, when moral judgments are taken to be judgments 
about what is valuable to all humans, or in Harris‟ terms, what is conducive to the well-being 
of humans in general. I think that this relational definition of moral judgments accurately 
captures what we mean by moral judgments as defined in chapter 2. I therefore think that 
Harris‟ theory is capable of meeting the first explanatory challenge. This means that on 
Harris‟ theory, moral judgments are truth-apt. 
The second challenge—which I consider the more difficult of the two—is discussed in 
chapters 7 through 11. As shown in chapter 7, it appears as if the only way that a relational 
moral judgment can be true, is if we make a non-scientific assumption about the nature of this 
relation. We could assume, for example, that all human beings—arguably also including 
future humans—are so constituted as to value the well-being of other people, or maximized 
total well-being. Science is incapable of showing us that this is the case. It is objected that if 
no such evaluative premise is assumed, there can be no truth conditions which could justify 
the truth of relational moral judgments. This is because human beings aren‟t identical, and as 
such don‟t share an identical relation to external events. A moral judgment proposes that, and 
is true if, all humans have a reason to act in accordance with it. But as there is no guarantee 
that any relational moral judgment—for example that caring for each other is good—will hold 
for all humans, it seems such judgments fail to have the appropriate binding force. 
Harris proposes to solve this problem by allowing moral truth to be inductive, like all 
other scientific truth. By doing so we can say that at least some actions—like raising the 
temperature on earth to 200 degrees centigrade—are morally bad, because such actions are 
systematically and reliably conducive to the suffering of all humans. There is of course no 
guarantee that there will not be some humans who flourish in such temperatures, but based on 
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what we know of biology the emergence of such a person seems as unlikely as air suddenly 
becoming heavier then water. Harris suggests that no one has any real reason to act against 
such judgments as “blowing up the earth is conducive to your suffering”. You could wrongly 
believe that blowing up the earth is conducive of well-being, but as the theory of natural value 
tells us, the well-being of conscious organisms is caused by external objects and events 
according to lawful and observable natural processes, so your beliefs don‟t change the fact 
that exploding is conducive of suffering (if this is the case). Harris thus suggests that if we can 
observe that an action reliably causes humans beings to suffer, we can say that the action is 
conducive to the suffering of all humans, and therefore bad. Further we can predict that the 
action will continue to case suffering in all future instances, and this prediction will be as 
binding on future humans as the law of gravity.   
Does Harris by this show that he can meet the second challenge (showing that there 
exist empirically available truth-conditions capable of justifying at least some moral 
judgments)?  I think it does, even though there remains much doubt about to what degree the 
challenge is actually met by “The Moral Landscape”, as I have attempted to show. Even if his 
theory allows for only a few, and very obvious, moral truths, it can count as a minimal form 
of moral realism. This conclusion is still open for debate though, because it might be 
reasonable to demand that meta-ethical moral realism should allow for the development of 
methods for solving substantial moral questions. Such methods include accepting evaluative 
principles—such as the principle of utility—on rational grounds, but as we have seen, Harris 
denies that this is possible.  
In chapters 9 through 11, I suggest how Harris can approach the hard questions of 
ethics. My primary strategy has been to argue that one of the obvious inductive moral facts 
that come out of science on Harris‟ model is that it is valuable to all humans to secure their 
own “sociocultural homeostasis”, which basically involves at least some degree of caring 
about and cooperating with other humans. As such it is possible to say that the well-being of 
others has some (relational) value for everyone. I think Harris supports this view, and he does 
provide some arguments for it. I mostly seems like he just accepts that the well-being of 
others is valuable to everyone, and I have suggested that this is what causes many of his critic 
to attribute this evaluation to him as a premise, and not as a contingent fact.  
All successful actions change the state of the universe as a consequence. A good way 
to understand the essence of Harris‟ moral theory is that among the almost endless states the 
universe can be changed into as a result of our actions, very few include humans in states of 
well-being. Most states of the universe don‟t even support human life, and most of those that 
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do contain too extreme conditions to be conducive of well-being; from lack of food and water 
to oppressive dictatorships and violent conflicts. Mapping the consequences of events in the 
world on human nervous systems helps us to narrow down the field of actions we can be said 
to have a reason to take. How far down the field can be narrowed will depend on how 
homogenous human nervous systems are. If brains turn out to be as homogenous as bodies 
(and the mental lawfully depends on the physical), it seems we have much reason to suspect 
that there are very narrow parameters where brains can be as happy and satisfied as they 
possibly can, in which case it seems plausible that a science of morality could be developed to 
become as factual and rational as medicine.  
In “The Moral Landscape” we find Harris making the following concluding remarks:      
 
“If we are not able to perfectly reconcile the tension between personal and 
collective well-being, there is still no reason to think that they are generally 
in conflict. Most boats will surely rise with the same tide. It is not at all 
difficult to envision the global changes that would improve life for everyone: 
We would all be better off in a world where we devoted fewer of our 
resources to preparing to kill one another. Finding clean sources of energy, 
cures for disease, improvements in agriculture, and new ways to facilitate 
human cooperation are general goals that are obviously worth striving for. 
What does such a claim mean? It means that we have every reason to believe 
that the pursuit of such goals will lead upward on the slopes of the moral 
landscape.” (ML p. 188) 
 
* 
 
Do we now think that science can determine human values?  Maybe. Perhaps at least some 
values, in some sense. Do we now understand how scientific knowledge can be said to be 
constitutive of human value?  I hope so, at least given the naturalistic framework on which 
this theory is based. We must however acknowledge that there remains genuine disagreement 
about whether or not Harris‟ theory deserves to be categorized as moral realism. If the 
conceptual framework of meta-ethics requires realist theories to give an evaluative premise in 
order to secure the resolution of moral disagreement, then Harris‟ theory fails, because it can‟t 
make such a non-empirical assumption.  
Harris himself does on occasions seemingly suggest that it might be unnecessary to talk 
about a science of morality and of moral truth. We could instead simply talk about a science 
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of well-being and of truths about well-being, and reserve the moral terminology for 
absolutistic theories. The normativity of these truths about well-being would not change as a 
result of such semantics. It is a fairly uncontroversial proposition that even if we reject the 
reality of (absolute) moral truth, we can still criticize various actions and practices. Russell 
Blackford—who has followed us through this thesis—views Harris theory as such a non-
realist, but normative, position: 
 
“It is quite open to us to condemn traditional systems of morality to the 
extent that they are harsh or cruel, rather than providing what most of us 
(quite rationally) want from a moral tradition: for example that it ameliorate 
suffering, regulate conflict, and provide personal security and social 
cooperation, yet allow individuals a substantial degree of discretion to live 
their lives as they wish.” (Blackford 2010) 
   
Harris responds to Blackford‟s view by saying that: 
 
“I'm afraid I have seen too much evidence to the contrary to accept 
Blackford's happy talk on this point. I consistently find that people who hold 
this view are far less clear-eyed and committed than (I believe) they should 
be when confronted with moral pathologies—especially those of other 
cultures—precisely because they believe there is no deep sense in which any 
behavior or system of thought can be considered pathological in the first 
place.” (Harris 2011) 
 
By referring to this exchange I wish to support the conclusion that there is remaining 
disagreement about whether or not non-absolutistic and normative theories really deserves to 
be categorizes under “moral realism”.  
Harris‟ insistence that the kind of moral truth he argues for really is moral truth, seems 
to me justified by his claim that these truths are on par with all other scientific truth, and 
thereby deserving of the same recognition. Based on Harris rejection of fact/value dualism 
and value absolutism I think that his claim to moral realism makes sense. Without value 
absolutism there could be no absolute moral truth in any case. I think that Harris theory 
amounts to a very good and well supported explanation of both the specified explanatory 
challenges—in its own currently limited and non-absolutistic way—as I have attempted to 
show. I will therefore conclude that Harris‟ theory of “The Moral Landscape” constitutes an 
appealing naturalist alternative to the other available explanations of morality. I do however 
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think that many aspects of the theory—specifically its normative implications, its reach, and 
its status as moral realism—needs to clarified and developed further, before we can start to 
seriously compare this theory to the rest of the alternatives. I think this is worth doing.     
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